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 1 
Abstract 
 The 1963 to 1989 period witnessed a rapid change in Canadian defence matters. 
During this period the Canadian government forced the military away from its traditional 
ally the United Kingdom and moved it closer to the United States (US). The Canadian 
governments of Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and Brian Mulroney attempted 
to create and retain a distinctive military with a truly ‘Canadian’ organization and with 
new Canadian military traditions. However, in the process of attempting to create a 
distinctive ‘Canadian’ military, all three of these governments moved the Canadian 
Forces (CF) closer towards the US military. While US defence and government officials 
welcomed an increased defence cooperation between Ottawa and Washington, they were 
often not responsible for the burgeoning ties between the US and Canadian armed forces. 
Moving the CF closer towards their American counterparts enabled Ottawa to keep its 
defence budget relatively stable without any drastic increases because of the promise of 
support from the larger US military. More importantly, this movement towards the US 
enabled all three prime ministers to continuously assure Washington of Canada’s abilities 
to help defend North America and participate in the cooperative NATO defence of 
Western Europe. Becoming a ‘strategic liability’ for the US in Western defence would 
have had grave consequences for Canadian sovereignty. For the Canadian government 
during this period, the only way to ensure Canada did not become a liability was to have 
the CF work closely with the US. As a result, Canadian defence policies during the Cold 
War strove to ensure that Canada was able to participate with the US in the defence of the 
West. 
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 4 
Introduction 
 With the end of the Second World War, the United States (US) became the 
dominant superpower of the Western world and worked to create a system to defend itself 
and its allies from the Soviet Union. Canada had traditionally identified with the interests 
of the United Kingdom (UK), but the declining power of the British Empire after 1945 
led Canada to look elsewhere for military support. During the Cold War, the United 
States military exerted great influence upon its allies within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). However, no other military felt this pressure greater than the 
Canadian armed forces. 
Prior to 1945, the Canadian military was primarily oriented towards the British 
Empire and was a small replica of the larger British military. In the nineteenth century, 
the US was viewed as Canada’s primary threat. However, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the Canadian government and population began to work closely with 
the US in economic and social spheres. With the onset of the Cold War, Canada also 
began to look towards the Americans for both political and military leadership. During 
the four decades following the Second World War, the military relationship between the 
two countries was to be unlike that of any other in the world. As the neighbour to an 
immense military superpower, the Canadian military saw the waning influence of the 
British military system give way to that of the powerful US military machine, and the 
Canadian military was transformed into a defence establishment that looked to the US for 
its primary support instead of the UK, its traditional ally.  
Even though the US armed forces exerted an increasingly powerful influence on 
the Canadian military, it was Canadian politicians attempting to ‘Canadianize’ the 
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military who forced Canada to adapt to US military models, strategies and equipment. 
This accomplished two important objectives for Ottawa. First, it enabled successive 
governments to keep their defence budgets relatively small during the Cold War. Second, 
it ensured that the United States government knew that Canada was able to defend its 
borders and participate in the defence of the West. While the first item was a bonus, it 
was the second that was necessary to ensure Canadian sovereignty and gave the Canadian 
government a perceived voice in Washington.  
Beginning with the unification of the Canadian Forces (CF) from 1964 to 1968 
through to the end of the 1980s, the Canadian military was transformed into a fighting 
organization that rapidly shifted from UK to US military models. During these three 
decades, the CF began to adopt significant elements of US military strategy, equipment, 
models and traditions in order to work more effectively with their North American 
neighbour. However, this was a process that had begun with the onset of hostilities 
between the Axis and Allied powers in 1939 and had slowly evolved during the Second 
World War and throughout the 1950s. When accepting an award in Kingston, Ontario, in 
1938, American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made a speech that was to change 
the course of North American security relations for the remainder of the twentieth 
century. Roosevelt assured Canada “that the people of the United States will not stand 
idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened.”1 Immediately afterwards, Canadian 
Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King responded and assured Roosevelt that 
Canada would not allow itself to become a staging area for any potential invasion of the 
                                                1	  J.L.	  Granatstein,	  Who	  Killed	  the	  Canadian	  Military?	  (Toronto:	  HarperCollins	  Canada,	  2004),	  37.	  The	  speech	  by	  Roosevelt	  caught	  King	  and	  the	  Canadian	  government	  completely	  off	  guard.	  Roosevelt’s	  statement	  is	  often	  characterized	  as	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Canadian-­‐American	  security	  relationship.	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US.2 While both of these statements were made in regard to the deteriorating situation in 
Europe, they were to lead to a comprehensive agreement that would allow for direct and 
continued military cooperation well beyond the end of the Second World War. The 
statements made by both leaders also opened the door for the powerful influence that the 
United States armed forces would have on Canada’s military during the Cold War. 
 Following the June 1940 defeat of France and the onset of the Battle of Britain, 
King and Roosevelt met at the town of Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940 to create 
an agreement that would formally announce Canadian-American defence cooperation. 
With the majority of the active Canadian military forces overseas defending the UK, 
King was eager to meet at Ogdensburg to ensure US assistance if Canada became 
threatened by the Axis powers. The meeting at Ogdensburg signaled a major shift in 
Canadian defence policy. For the first time, the Canadian armed forces were looking to a 
country other than the UK for military assistance. The senior leadership of the American 
military was not content with simple assistance and instead wished for the creation of a 
joint Canadian-American military with a single chain-of-command.  
Throughout the Ogdensburg Conference, and for the remainder of the Second 
World War, US military leaders strove to get politicians in Ottawa and Washington to 
reach a North American defence agreement. Such a development would enable American 
and Canadian forces to participate together under a single command.3 However, this was 
immediately rejected by the Canadian military, as it would have given the US operational 
control of all Canadian forces engaged in the defence of North America.4 The attempt by 
                                                2	  Granatstein,	  Who	  Killed	  the	  Canadian	  Military?,	  37.	  3	  Brian	  Cuthbertson,	  Canadian	  Military	  Independence	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Superpowers	  (Don	  Mills,	  ON:	  Fitzhenry	  &	  Whiteside,	  1977),	  15.	  4	  Ibid.,	  22.	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the US military commanders for a bilateral agreement was to become the main fear of 
Canadian military and government leaders in regards to the North American security 
relationship. This coincided with the longstanding Canadian fear of US control of 
Canadian foreign and domestic policies. After having its military fight under the 
command of the UK in two world wars, the Canadian government had a strong desire to 
retain control of its own forces in any future conflict. 
King and Roosevelt created several defence structures at Ogdensburg that would 
become long-standing pillars of the Canada-US defence relationship. Arguably, this 
meeting created the most important element in North American defence relations during 
the Cold War, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). The PJBD consisted of 
Canadian and American members who were instructed to develop plans to coordinate the 
defence of North America.5 Both leaders also took the very important step of deciding 
that any agreement signed at Ogdensburg would continue after the end of the Second 
World War. While this meeting is often seen as a sidebar, it was the Ogdensburg 
Agreement that allowed Canadian-American defence relations to flourish during the Cold 
War. 
From the beginning of negotiations at Ogdensburg in 1940 and continuing into the 
immediate post-war years, however, a comprehensive bilateral defence agreement was 
not on the Canadian agenda. Canadian diplomat Escott Reid made this abundantly clear 
in a 1947 meeting between Canadian and American officials. Reid pointed out that any 
military cooperation between the two allies was only possible in the framework of a 
                                                5	  Granatstein,	  Who	  Killed	  the	  Canadian	  Military?,	  39.	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larger alliance in which both countries were loyal members.6 It was feared that Canadian 
territory and military units would instantly come under US command if Canada entered 
into any bilateral military alliance with Washington. By signing a bilateral military 
agreement with their large neighbour, Canada would instantly become the junior partner, 
which would effectively leave all Canadian military units under US command and 
control.7 Instead, Ottawa argued that mutual cooperation become the basis for all 
command decisions in joint Canadian-US military actions.8 It was clear to Washington 
that Canadian fears of losing control of its military forces would not allow for a bilateral 
treaty to be signed encompassing all aspects of North American security.  Despite 
Canadian fears, the senior military leadership of Canada’s military was not an unwilling 
partner in increased cooperation with the American military juggernaut in both 
continental and NATO defence.  
While Canada’s defence links with the US expanded, Ottawa began to move away 
from its traditional military ties with the UK. Following the material and financial 
devastation of the 1940s, the British government faced the prospect of granting freedom 
to many of the remaining British colonies. With more and more colonies being granted or 
winning their freedom, a strong anti-British and anti-imperial sentiment began to take 
hold in many of these former colonies. With this ongoing backlash against the British 
Empire, the Canadian government and military began to realize that a more ‘Canadian’ 
military model was needed in the post-imperial world. This need was made abundantly 
clear to future Prime Minister Lester Pearson during the 1956 Suez Crisis.  
                                                6	  Arthur	  Andrew,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  a	  Middle	  Power:	  Canadian	  Diplomacy	  from	  King	  to	  Mulroney	  (Toronto:	  James	  Lorimer	  and	  Company,	  Publishers,	  1993),	  28.	  7	  Cuthbertson,	  Canadian	  Military	  Independence	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Superpowers,	  25.	  8	  Ibid.,	  15.	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Following concerted efforts by Pearson to broker a peace after the invasion of 
Egyptian territory by French, British and Israeli forces, the Queen’s Own Rifles of 
Canada were sent to help keep the peace around the Suez Canal.9 Soon after the 
Regiment’s arrival, the Egyptian government launched a number of complaints to Ottawa 
regarding the Canadian military’s strong British-oriented traditions. These complaints 
made many Canadian military and Foreign Affairs personnel realize that adhering to a 
British model and dress code was not attractive in a post-colonial world.10  This 
sentiment was magnified by the events that ensued surrounding the arrival of the Royal 
Canadian Navy’s aircraft carrier, HMCS Magnificent, at Port Said, Egypt. The carrier 
arrived flying the traditional White Ensign of the Royal Navy and its Commonwealth 
allies. As the Egyptians had only recently been engaged in combat operations with the 
Royal Navy, the ensign was taken as a form of hostility and it was only the interference 
of United States naval personnel at Port Said that prevented Egyptian forces from firing 
on the Canadian ship.11 The incidents that the Canadian Army and the RCN experienced 
in Egypt convinced the leadership of the armed forces that they needed a different 
military model. Many within the military and the government also recognized that if 
Canada were to undertake peacekeeping operations, they would frequently occur in 
nations that were former colonies.  
While the Canadian armed forces were facing challenges to their identity in 
operations overseas, the federal government was in the process of bringing the Canadian 
air force into a joint North American defence force with the US. In July 1957 Prime 
                                                9	  J.L.	  Granatstein,	  Canada’s	  Army:	  Waging	  War	  and	  Keeping	  the	  Peace	  (Toronto:	  University	  of	  Toronto	  Press,	  2011),	  347.	  10	  Andrew,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  a	  Middle	  Power,	  28.	  11	  Granatstein,	  Canada’s	  Army,	  348.	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Minister John Diefenbaker agreed to the creation of the North American Air (later 
Aerospace) Defence Command (NORAD) that would officially integrate US and 
Canadian air defence forces within North America. Supporters of the agreement argued 
that this would allow Canada to both better exercise protection of its airspace and also 
allow Canada to gain a voice in Washington.12 Meanwhile, detractors of NORAD argued 
that this was handing over Canadian military forces and sovereignty to the US and that 
Canada would soon become simply a tool of the US government and military.13 Through 
almost a year of government and public debates, the federal government finally agreed to 
formally sign the agreement in May 1958. The NORAD agreement was one of the few 
bilateral treaties signed between the two countries in which Ottawa agreed to an 
American commander having certain operational command over elements of the 
Canadian military.  
The events of the 1940s and 1950s were to be a stepping-stone for increased 
cooperation between Ottawa and Washington over the course of the next three decades. 
Prime Ministers Lester Pearson, Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney all attempted to 
retain a truly Canadian defence policy and military force. However, in the process of 
trying to accomplish this goal, the politicians pushed Canadian defense institutions to 
cooperate closely with their American counterparts. This led to the adoption of US 
organizational structures and military strategies by the CF for much of the Cold War. For 
much of the latter half of the twentieth century the CF slowly transformed from long 
standing British traditions towards a more North American model that drew heavily from 
the different branches of the United States Armed Forces. This was not a process that 
                                                12	  Granatstein,	  Canada’s	  Army,	  347.	  13	  Andrew,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  a	  Middle	  Power,	  348.	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occurred overnight but instead took many years to develop and continued into the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.  
Canadian-American defence relations are a well-studied topic among military 
historians. The majority of these scholars acknowledge the defence cooperation that 
developed between these two countries during the Cold War, but few examine the 
growing influence that the US military had on the Canadian Forces during this period. 
Three distinct schools of thought exist concerning the development of North American 
security relations during the Cold War. The first school emphasizes the role and 
importance of the Canadian military but contends that bilateral defence relations between 
the two countries have forced the CF to become utterly dependent on the US armed 
forces.14 This argument stems from two important points: the belief that the US can 
impose its North American security demands upon the CF at will, and the fact that 
Canadian military forces often operate under American command in Alliance relations. 
These historians also contend that the Canadian defence establishment has always been 
tied to a powerful ally and that in the 1960s it simply switched from the UK to the US. 
Although this is a useful theory when examining North American defence relations 
during the Cold War, it fails to take into account the critical role that the Canadian 
government played in pursuing many of the defence agreements. Historians who 
advocate this theory have published some of the most important works in Canadian-
American military relations during the Cold War. Among these are Joel Sokolsky and 
Joseph Jockel’s edited collection of essays analyzing Canada’s bilateral military 
                                                14	  Justin	  Massie,	  “Canada’s	  (In)dependence	  in	  the	  North	  American	  Security	  Community:	  The	  Asymmetrical	  Norm	  of	  Common	  Fate,”	  American	  Review	  of	  Canadian	  Studies	  37,	  no.	  4	  (2007),	  494.	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alliances, Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defence Cooperation,15 and Sokolsky’s 
Defending Canada.16 In both of these influential works the authors argue that North 
American defence between the two countries was characterized by Canada having to use 
the US military to assist them in almost all aspects of its defence duties. Furthermore, 
Jockel and Sokolsky contend in both works that the constant reductions in the Canadian 
defence budget and personnel resulted in Canada having to adhere to many American 
military strategies and demands during the Cold War. 
Proponents of this analytical school have been challenged by a second group of 
Canadian military scholars arguing that North American defence relations during the 
Cold War were founded upon common norms and values held by Ottawa and 
Washington. In essence, this school argues that Canada and the United States have 
created a “liberal democratic security community, founded upon shared norms of mutual 
expectations and sovereignty, as well upon values and political norms.”17 Foremost 
among these scholars are Canadian military historians Bernd Horn and Robert Bothwell. 
Horn’s edited collection of essays, The Canadian Way of War,18 and Bothwell’s Alliance 
and Illusion19 contend that Canada did not become dependent on the US but instead 
worked closely with the Americans because of a similarity in international objectives. 
Horn argues that a similar world and regional view held by Canadian and American 
military personnel were the main reason that Canada worked very closely with the US 
                                                15	  Joel	  J.	  Sokolsky	  &	  Joseph	  T.	  Jockel,	  ed.,	  Fifty	  Years	  of	  Canada-­‐United	  States	  Defence	  Cooperation:	  The	  
Road	  from	  Ogdensburg	  (Lewiston,	  NY:	  Mellen	  Press,	  1992).	  16	  Joel	  J.	  Sokolsky,	  Defending	  Canada:	  U.S.-­‐Canadian	  Defense	  Policies	  (New	  York:	  Priority	  Press	  Publications,	  1989).	  17	  Massie,	  “Canada’s	  (In)dependence,”	  503.	  18	  Colonel	  Bernd	  Horn,	  ed.,	  The	  Canadian	  Way	  of	  War:	  Serving	  the	  National	  Interest	  (Toronto:	  Dundurn	  Press,	  2006).	  19	  Robert	  Bothwell,	  Alliance	  and	  Illusion:	  Canada	  and	  the	  World,	  1945-­‐1984	  (Vancouver:	  University	  of	  British	  Columbia	  Press,	  2007).	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military.20 Bothwell, meanwhile, argues that Canada’s military contribution to alliances 
was predicated on similar democratic values and norms it holds with the other alliance 
members.21 However, by examining the common values held by the two countries, these 
scholars do not acknowledge the immense pressure the American government and 
military placed on their Canadian counterparts to adhere to American military strategies 
and plans. These scholars also do not often discuss the fact that Canada worked almost 
exclusively with the US both within and outside of NATO and rarely with the other 
Western nations that also held similar world-views with Canada.  
 Finally, a third group of scholars contends that Canadian-American military 
cooperation did not occur because of similar democratic values or Canada’s dependence 
on the US military; instead, it was a tool used by the Canadian government during the 
Cold War for other purposes. These authors argue that successive federal governments 
throughout the Cold War used the immense size of the US military and American 
security concerns to their advantage by having the US take on a large role in Canadian 
defence efforts.22 Two important works representative of this school of thought are J.L. 
Granatstein’s Canada’s Army23 and John Blaxland’s Strategic Cousins.24 Granatstein 
argues that Canada was able to get by in NATO without having to contribute heavily to 
the overall defence of the Alliance because of its close proximity to the US and its role in 
assisting the US in North American defence. Blaxland argues that Canada kept its 
military budget and force numbers low by sending its forces on UN missions to areas that 
                                                20	  Horn,	  The	  Canadian	  Way	  of	  War,	  288.	  21	  Bothwell,	  Alliance	  and	  Illusion,	  261.	  22	  Massie,	  “Canada’s	  (In)dependence,”	  503.	  23	  Granatstein,	  Canada’s	  Army.	  24	  John	  C.	  Blaxland,	  Strategic	  Cousins:	  Australian	  and	  Canadian	  Expeditionary	  Forces	  and	  the	  British	  
and	  American	  Empires	  (Montreal	  and	  Kingston:	  McGill-­‐Queen’s	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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were of strategic importance to the Pentagon and by partnering Canadian units with 
American forces throughout the world. While this theory is important to the study of 
North American defence relations during the Cold War, it focuses mainly on Canada’s 
overseas commitments and often glosses over cooperation between the two militaries 
within North America. It also does not take into account the demands that the US placed 
on Ottawa to restructure and rebuild its forces during the 1980s. 
 While all three of these schools of thought encompass the majority of the 
historiography on Canadian-American defence relations during the Cold War, there are 
some overarching holes in this historiography. One of these is that many existing works 
focus solely either on government interactions between Ottawa and Washington or the 
military cooperation between the Canadian and American militaries. Both of these are the 
main elements of North American defence cooperation. But since Canada and the US are 
democracies, the federal government and military of each country should not be treated 
as separate entities by scholars discussing Canadian-American Cold War defence 
cooperation. A second gap in the literature results from scholars focusing primarily on 
defence cooperation between the two allies during the Second World War and at the very 
end of the Cold War, while paying minimal attention to defence relations developed 
between 1960 and 1989. Combined, these are two important holes in the historiography 
of the subject that need to be filled in order to provide a concise overview of the military 
cooperation between the United States and Canada that developed during the Pearson, 
Trudeau and Mulroney governments. 
This thesis will attempt to address these historical gaps by examining three 
primary chronological periods. Chapter One will examine the unification of the branches 
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of the Canadian military between 1964 and 1968. Beginning with the announcement in 
1964 to unify the Canadian military, officials began to mothball many of the traditional 
links between the Canadian and British militaries. As the 1960s progressed and 
unification became a reality with the formal creation of the Canadian Forces, it was clear 
that Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer was more closely aligning the Canadian 
defence establishment with the US. Both Hellyer and Prime Minister Pearson wanted to 
develop a distinctly Canadian identity in the country’s armed forces. Hellyer was keenly 
interested in the US military system, in particular the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC), which he viewed as a key model for the newly unified Canadian Forces. 
Members of both the Canadian Senate and House of Commons were concerned that 
Hellyer was attempting to create a ‘fifth-service’ for the US armed forces. Coincidentally, 
it was also during the unification debates that cooperation between the two neighbours in 
military affairs began to become standard operating procedure.  
 Chapter Two will examine changing defence roles and policies adopted by the 
Trudeau government in the late 1960s and 1970s. For much of this period, Trudeau 
turned Canadian defence priorities upside down when he demanded that the CF focus 
their main effort on the protection of Canadian sovereignty. Despite the need for 
significant air, naval and land forces to enforce Canadian sovereignty, Trudeau was 
constantly reducing the relative defence budget and the manpower of the CF and often 
refused to provide the CF with the equipment they needed. Reallocation of Canadian 
units from Europe to North American defence and vast reductions in capabilities, 
manpower, and equipment led to the CF looking towards the US for assistance in 
completing many of their military objectives assigned by the Trudeau government.  
 16 
 Finally, Chapter Three will look at the ‘rebuilding’ of the CF during the 1980s by 
Prime Ministers Trudeau and Mulroney and how the US military was integrated into this 
process by Canadian government and defence officials. Both prime ministers worked 
closely with the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and President Ronald 
Reagan in order to help reshape NATO strategy and continental defence arrangements in 
order to meet the growing Soviet conventional threat. It was also during the 1980s that 
the Pentagon took on an increased role to help get the CF more manpower and better 
equipment. This was a period in which both external and internal pressures on the 
Canadian military led to increased cooperation and acceptance of American military 
trends. The US began to exert pressure on Ottawa, realizing that a larger and better-
equipped CF would only help defend American interests and free up US military assets 
for other operations.   
Between 1964 and 1989 Ottawa and Washington developed a highly intricate 
military relationship that was to see the militaries of both countries begin to work 
together closely. It was during this period that the military of the US replaced that of the 
UK as the Canadian Forces primary alliance partner. Despite the importance that 
successive Canadian governments put on the development of a purely Canadian defence 
strategy, these same politicians inadvertently moved the CF closer to their American 
counterparts. Realizing the potential benefits to Canadian security and the economy, 
politicians in Ottawa looked to move the military closer to the US. This is an important 
era in Canadian military history, as it was during this period of continuously high 
international tensions that Canada and the US began to develop an integrated continental 
defence structure. Eventually this cooperation in North America would expand to both 
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countries’ military forces partaking in international alliances and commitments, which 
would result in Canadian and American forces working and supporting each other 
throughout the world. Through the examination of primary documents such as the papers 
of Defence Ministers Paul Hellyer and Barney Danson and House of Commons and 
Senate documents, this study will seek to show how Canadian politicians, not American 
government or military officials, moved the CF towards the US over a twenty-five year 
period at the height of the Cold War. In moving the CF towards their superpower 
neighbour, the governments of Pearson, Trudeau and Mulroney recognized the security 
and economic benefits that a closer military relationship with the US could bring to 
Canada. 
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Chapter One 
The Canadian Military and the Unification Debate, 1963-1968 
 
On 25 April 1967, the Canadian Parliament passed the Canadian Forces 
Reorganization Act. This was followed with the official names of the Canadian Army, 
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) being dropped and 
renamed as the Canadian Forces on 1 February 1968. While this greatly shocked many 
Canadians, it was the result of a process that had begun as early as 1964 with a desire by 
newly elected Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson to move the Canadian military away 
from its British roots and traditions and create a distinctly Canadian defence 
establishment. In the search for a purely Canadian military identity, Ottawa looked 
towards the United States with their large and global armed forces for assistance in 
developing a Canadian approach to reorganizing its armed forces.  
The movement towards the US military under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Pearson and Defence Minister Paul Hellyer occurred in three distinct phases between 
1964 and 1967. First, the Pearson government gave Hellyer free reign to remove British 
traditions from the Canadian military. The debacle of the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 was 
still fresh in the minds of Pearson and Hellyer, and they both believed that to ensure this 
would not happen in the future the Canadian military would have to be reshaped and 
given a new set of distinctly ‘Canadian’ traditions. Hellyer was given the go-ahead to 
begin this process in 1964 and was effectively finished eliminating many British 
traditions and customs by 1966. Second, Hellyer took a serious look at reorganizing the 
Canadian military along the lines of the United States Marine Corps (USMC). This was 
tantalizing to Hellyer, as not only would it help show Washington that Canada took its 
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defence seriously, but it also would allow him to create a tri-service, highly mobile force. 
These discussions came at a rapid pace beginning soon after the release of the 1964 
White Paper on Defence and captivated the public along with military and government 
officials. However, these discussions had effectively ended by late 1965 because of the 
widespread opposition to the plan from both the public and the military. Finally, the 
Canadian military began to realize the future of NATO relations and started to move 
towards their US counterparts for assistance in altering certain segments of Hellyer’s 
unification strategies. These discussions began in the summer of 1965 after it was clear to 
the military that the Pearson government was going to ensure that unification became a 
reality. While these discussions continued into 1968 they trailed off significantly when 
Hellyer left the Ministry of National Defence in the fall of 1967.   
Ultimately these three distinct phases were the beginning of the ‘Canadianization’ 
project of the CF that would last the remainder of the Cold War. In its attempt to find and 
develop a distinct Canadian military identity, the leading officials of the Pearson Cabinet, 
including the Prime Minister himself, began the push of the CF towards their US 
counterparts. Hellyer and Pearson both realized that creating a tri-service force with a 
new identity would allow them to reduce flourishing Canadian defence budgets by 
eliminating any excess funding that went to the military because of service rivalry and 
competition for funds. Politicians throughout Ottawa also encouraged Pearson and his 
Cabinet to go ahead with their plans, as it would show the US that Canada cared about its 
military defence and was prepared to adapt to the US superpower and away from the UK. 
The Move Away from British Military Traditions (1964-1966) 
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While many members of the armed forces and the government were shocked at 
Canada’s movement away from UK military models and traditions and its rapid push 
towards the US, this was a process that had begun as early as 1956. Following the Suez 
Crisis and the problems that the Canadian Army and the RCN faced in their peacekeeping 
operations as a result of their dependence on British traditions and models, the 
government and military began to slowly sever their military ties with London. With its 
official membership in NATO in 1949 and NORAD in 1958, the Canadian military role 
models began to gradually shift towards the US.25  
When the Canadian government agreed to station land and air units in Western 
Europe after the creation of NATO, it planned to have them placed with American units; 
however, this was unacceptable to London, as it would lead to Commonwealth military 
units under US, not UK command.26 After much debate, US General Dwight Eisenhower 
was able to get an agreement from Ottawa, London and Washington in late 1951 in which 
all Canadian land units in Europe would be placed with the British Army of the Rhine 
(BAOR).27 Meanwhile, all RCAF units would be placed with United States Air Force 
(USAF) units on the continent. The Canadian naval contributions would answer to a 
United States Navy (USN) commander based in Norfolk, Virginia. This left a bitter taste 
in the mouths of many senior Canadian commanders and the upper echelons of the 
government and reinforced the belief that Canada needed to move its defence 
establishment away from its traditional UK benefactor. They feared that if they did not 
move the defence establishment away from the UK, then the Canadian military would 
                                                
25 Andrew, The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power, 136. Even though NATO was not a bilateral alliance 
between the two North American neighbours, Canada routinely found itself having to participate more and 
more with the American forces in NATO than with any other nation in the Alliance. 26	  Granatstein,	  Canada’s	  Army,	  336.	  	  27	  Ibid.,	  336.	  
 21 
answer to London and not Ottawa. Although this arrangement had Canadian units in 
separate theatres and would prevent a unified Canadian military force in the event of a 
war, it also reflected a growing trend in the Canadian military establishment.  
After his election victory in 1963, Pearson was faced with a Canadian military 
that was being pulled in two different directions. The RCN was attempting to ensure its 
British traditions and alliance with the Royal Navy (RN), while the RCAF was trying to 
move the military away from its traditional roles and traditions and towards a new main 
alliance partner in the US armed forces. General Jean Victor Allard observed the 
differences when he became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in 1966: “I had found a 
highly Americanized Air Force, a very British Navy, and an Army that, particularly since 
the Korean War, stood between those two extremes and, therefore, was the most 
Canadian of our three arms.”28 These competing realities were pulling the Canadian 
military in three different directions and the new Liberal government believed that if they 
did not get a handle on the situation the military would be more responsive to 
Washington and London than to Ottawa. 
The need for a Canadian defence policy and reorientation of the military was 
further emphasized by the difficulties the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group 
(4CMBG) was having in the BAOR as a result of Ottawa trying to appease both the UK 
and the US. Soon after its arrival in Europe during 1953, the 4CMBG came under the 
command of the British generals who led the BAOR. Quickly, British military leaders 
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made the 4CMBG one of the main forward defence units in their sector.29 While the 
RCAF and RCN developed increasing ties with their US counterparts, the Army was 
solely focused on maintaining interoperability with the British Army because of its 
commitment to the British sector of Europe.30 However, its ability to seamlessly operate 
with the BAOR was severely degraded during the 1960s with the introduction of newer 
equipment, which was often bought from the US and not the UK.  American M113 
armoured personnel carriers (APC), M109 self-propelled artillery and US-style anti-
aircraft and anti-tank weapons were brought to the 4th Brigade. The result was that the 
Army, and particularly the 4CMBG, developed a doctrine in the early 1960s derived from 
a mixture of both UK and US sources.31 The new American equipment and doctrines 
complicated the logistical support and command structure for the brigade as they now 
depended on British logistics units to supply non-British items to the brigade.32 It was 
clear that the Government was going to have to choose one direction for the Army, as it 
could not continue to be pulled in two different directions. 
While the Canadian Army was trying to continue its interoperability with their 
British counterparts, the government was moving it closer towards the US Army for 
logistical purposes. With the introduction of more and more American equipment, the 
Canadian brigade finally made arrangements in 1964 with the US Central Army Group 
(CENTAG) for the provision of spare parts and supplies.33 The Canadian government and 
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senior military leaders had opened the door for American influence on the Army, which 
was being forced to move away from its traditional ties with the UK.  
The RCN and the Army were traditionally close to the British forces and were 
often placed under the operational command of British commanders during a military 
crisis. The Liberal government of Pearson sought to remove the British control of not 
only the Armed Forces but over all government organizations. Upon taking office in 
1963, the Pearson government came to the conclusion that the RCN was very expensive 
and was ‘too British’ to promote Canadian national interests.34 Furthermore, much of the 
senior cadre of leadership of the RCN was British trained, although most of the enlisted 
men and junior officers felt little allegiance towards the RN.35 Similar to the Navy, the 
Army’s officer corps also held a close allegiance with their British counterparts. It was 
found that in 1966 seventy-three percent of Canadian officers and sixty-three percent of 
enlisted personnel were of British descent.36 Much of the senior cadre of leadership in all 
three branches of the Canadian military were British-trained and, therefore, felt a strong 
allegiance with their British counterparts.37 Because of these close affiliations, Hellyer 
was determined to unify the forces and eliminate as many of the British affiliations as 
possible within the military. Indeed, one of his main objectives on reforming the military 
institution was to redirect the loyalties of the officers away from their traditional services 
and towards the new force.38 As British traditions, models and allegiances were slowly 
removed from the military establishment, many of the officers and enlisted men began to 
look for another ally to assist them in their military operations. In their efforts to unify the 
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military and move it away from its British roots, both Hellyer and Pearson brought the 
armed forces under the large shadow of the US military.  
Early in 1964 Hellyer announced in Parliament that he had created a new defence 
policy that would ‘Canadianize’ the armed forces. His policy was soon laid out in the 
1964 White Paper on Defence, which revealed that the RCAF, RCN, and Army would 
lose all of their British style names in order to represent a modern military that would be 
able to support each other on land, air and sea under one commander. Hellyer argued that 
Unification was necessary, as it would enhance the civilian government control of the 
military, which would force the CF to look towards Ottawa for direction and not towards 
Canada’s allies.39 With the British demand that all Commonwealth forces be under its 
command in Europe fresh in his mind, Hellyer believed that the military was focused 
solely on NATO duties and responded to allied commanders and not to the elected 
Canadian government.40 In particular, Hellyer and the remainder of Pearson’s Cabinet 
were determined to change the age-old tradition of Canadian military units being 
responsive solely to the British high command in times of war.  
The central idea of the 1964 White Paper was to develop a defence institution 
based on Canadian needs and national interests and not those of their allies. However, 
many of the senior leadership of the armed forces and members of the Official 
Opposition argued that Hellyer’s Unification was bringing the military more closely 
together with their southern neighbours. Former Minister of National Defence Douglas 
Harkness argued in Parliament in 1965 that the only thing that reorganization had done 
“has been to allow the army to ride on the United States supply line rather than on the 
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British, as has been the case heretofore.”41 By eliminating many of the British traditions 
in the armed forces, Hellyer had opened the door to the expanding American influence in 
Canadian society.  
During a Parliamentary debate on 6 July 1964, Progressive Conservative MP 
Walter G. Dinsdale contended that the proposed Bill C-90, “An Act to Amend the 
National Defence Act”, would force the CDS to merely accept the strategic policy 
previously agreed to between the Canadian and American governments.42 Furthermore, 
other members of the Official Opposition looked at Unification as a method by the 
Liberal government to simply switch the armed forces’ allegiance to the Pentagon and 
away from Whitehall. It was becoming clear to many in both Parliament and the military 
that Hellyer was determined to eliminate as much ‘Britishness’ from the military as 
possible, including full regiments. Finally, members of Parliament began to echo the 
opinions of Canadian military leaders who argued that keeping Canadian forces closely 
aligned with both the UK and US armed forces would prevent any one of those nations 
from becoming the predominant strategic controller of Canadian military units in 
wartime. In Hellyer’s haste to move the Canadian military towards independence from 
both the UK and US, he succeeded in accidentally moving it towards the shadow of the 
much larger American military. 
Similar to members of the Official Opposition, there was also anger directed 
towards Hellyer from within the military. One of the primary opponents of unification 
and the growing ‘Americanization’ of the military by the Government was Admiral Jeffry 
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Brock of the RCN. Brock argued that Hellyer’s intention of giving Canada a distinctive 
military force only succeeded in further helping to Americanize the armed forces by 
eliminating many of their Canadian-British traditions.43 Brock maintained that there was 
a “rather cynical belief in Western military circles that, in our enthusiasm to ‘shed the 
British yoke’ we have donned the harness of another team that runs faster… and wants to 
go further than we had bargained for.”44 While Brock, as the Maritime Commander 
Atlantic, had an up-close view of Hellyer’s Unification and the military’s move towards 
closer cooperation with the US, his view of Unification was shared by many of the senior 
cadre of leadership within the RCN and the Army. Among the senior members of the 
Canadian military, particularly the RCN, who were critical of unification were Admiral 
Bill Landymore (Brock’s replacement as Maritime Commander Atlantic), recently 
promoted Vice-Admiral Ken Dyer and Commodore A.B. Harris, himself a former 
member of the Royal Navy. Similar to Brock, all three of these high-ranking officers 
were soon either forced to resign or retired from active service. A total of twenty-eight 
officers of general or admiral rank and seventy-nine senior officers (colonels, 
commodores and wing commanders) left the military from 1964 to 1966.45 
As the Canadian units in Europe were being forced to develop a close relationship 
with their US counterparts to ensure their own survival, Hellyer and the rest of Pearson’s 
Cabinet were in the process of rapidly trying to stamp out the remaining ‘Britishness’ 
from the Army. In a 1965 meeting between the Minister and the senior officers of the 
Army, it was made clear that Hellyer wanted the old traditions to go and be replaced by a 
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set of new ‘Canadian traditions’. Despite this, the Army held their ground to keep some 
of their more important traditions. One of Hellyer’s main targets was to eliminate the 
distinctive regimental names that dominated the Army’s history. He made it clear to the 
senior officers that he intended to strike these names from the order-of-battle and have 
them replaced with new names that would help create a series of new Canadian military 
traditions.46 The Army, however, was vehemently opposed to this idea and began to 
mount a significant resistance to the ideas of the Pearson government. Finally, in early 
1966, the spirited resistance of the Army, and the national Tri-Service Identities 
Organization (TRIO) began to sway the Pearson administration towards the Army and the 
traditional regimental names were retained.47 
The backlash against the removal of these traditions was only heightened when 
Hellyer announced to Parliament in the summer of 1965 that the Department of National 
Defence would look at eliminating some of Canada’s most traditional regiments from the 
order-of-battle. Hellyer announced that four regiments would be eliminated by 1968: the 
Canadian Guards, the Fort Garry Horse, the Black Watch and the Queen’s Own Rifles.48 
The regimental Lieutenant Colonel of the Canadian Guards, Colonel Strome Galloway, 
made his frustrations evident in his memoirs. Galloway argued that Hellyer’s Unification 
was simply a “gimmick to ‘Americanize’ the Canadian forces and eliminate, as far as 
possible, the British traditions of the past.”49 It was clear that Hellyer was determined to 
press forward with his plan, even if this meant that he had to remove four of Canada’s 
most famous regiments from the Order-of-Battle.  
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Furthermore, the Minister demanded that the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), 
Canada’s most senior infantry regiment, amalgamate with the Canadian Guards Regiment 
with a distinctly Canadian name.50 However, this proposed amalgamation was rapidly 
dropped, as both Hellyer and Pearson believed there would be a backlash against the 
RCR’s removal from the Canadian public.51 Brock, and other senior members of the 
armed forces, firmly believed that this was a mistake as the Canadian forces were 
patterned after those of the Commonwealth and without this organization they would be 
placed under increasing pressure to fully integrate with US forces.52 
In response to both his critics within the armed forces and Parliament, Hellyer 
argued that the military had always set its own policies, not the government. Therefore, 
he believed that the military was more responsive to its allies in London than to Ottawa.53 
One way to change this was to force the military to respond to the government and move 
it towards the US as its primary ally in order to eliminate all holdovers of the British 
system throughout the armed forces. He argued in both the public and private spheres that 
British traditions in the military (particularly the Navy) were obsolete and that they 
should cooperate more closely with the US armed forces, which represented a more 
modern military system.54 However, in order to proceed with unification he firmly 
believed that he not only had to remove the traditions themselves but also those senior 
commanders who were firm supporters of them.  
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In early 1964 Hellyer made it clear that he was determined to move the military in 
a new direction, and towards a new primary ally, by prematurely retiring Rear-Admiral 
Brock in the summer of 1964 and replacing him with commanders who would not engage 
in public debates regarding Government policies. However, Brock’s replacement, 
Admiral William Landymore, also did not agree with Hellyer’s proposals and proved to 
be an outspoken critic within the military until he was also prematurely retired by Hellyer 
in 1968. Indeed, Hellyer made it clear in his memoirs that he had forced Brock and 
Landymore to retire as their “devotion to the outmoded class distinctions inherited from 
the Royal Navy was inappropriate to the modern Canadian navy…”55 With the loss of 
many of its senior officers, Hellyer was soon able to bring the Navy to its knees by 
eliminating some of its most cherished traditions.  
The Navy became the main critics of unification and the removal of British 
traditions from the military. The RCN’s uniforms, flags, and customs were all modeled 
after the RN and were all being targeted for removal by Hellyer.56 The first to go was the 
traditional White Ensign in February 1965, which had been the only flag flown by RCN 
vessels, being replaced by the new Canadian flag.57 With the end of the White Ensign, 
many in the RCN saw it as the formal severing of ties between the RCN and RN. This 
was followed by an announcement from the Minister in June 1965 to the senior officers 
of the military, indicating that a single-service uniform would replace the distinctive 
service uniforms of all the military units by 1 July 1967.58 This was a large blow to the 
Navy as not only were they to lose their traditional name but also their distinctive 
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uniforms, which was one of the few British traditions left in the RCN. It was clear that 
the Navy was not prepared to assist Hellyer in Unification and, therefore, he looked to the 
biggest proponents of unification, the RCAF, for the first Chief of Defence Staff. 
In 1964 Air Chief Marshal Frank Robert Miller was promoted as the first CDS. 
Hellyer firmly believed that as the RCAF supported unification Miller would provide him 
with a strong counterpoint to the Navy and Army commanders speaking out against his 
proposals.59 However, Miller chose to focus on his duties as CDS and not become 
involved in the ongoing debate between the military officers and Hellyer and chose to 
retire in 1966 when it was clear that Hellyer was going to force him to support his plans 
in this debate. This was followed by the appointment of General Jean-Victor Allard as the 
new CDS in 1966, an act that saw Hellyer bypass other high-ranking officials. The Vice-
Chief of the Defence Staff was Lieutenant-General (Army) Robert Moncel, and he was 
expected to succeed Miller as the second CDS.60 However, after Moncel had made it 
clear that he had objections to Unification, Hellyer bypassed Moncel and promoted 
Allard.61 It was believed that Allard became the new CDS because he did not have a 
strong devotion to British-style traditions, which was important to Hellyer after the 
embarrassment of Canadian forces in the 1956 Suez Crisis.62 Allard shared Hellyer’s 
view concerning total control of the military by the government. In his memoirs, Allard 
points out that with its airmen in the American sector and its soldiers in the British sector, 
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it would have been almost impossible for the CDS and government to maintain complete 
control of the administration and employment of Canadian units.63  
Soon after taking command as the new CDS, Allard began to work closely with 
his US counterparts in developing strategic military policy for NATO and NORAD. In 
particular, he believed there were two important thresholds for the two countries to cross: 
standardization of equipment and the development of shared and common military 
objectives. As the CDS, Allard argued that the CF had an important role in the 
standardization of equipment and communications between Canada, the US, the UK, and 
Australia, the nations he believed formed the backbone of the Western world.64 Allard 
also firmly believed that for these four countries to form a strong military alliance, they 
all must strive to eliminate “particular characteristics in favour of total conformity with 
shared objectives.”65 While these were the opinions of the new CDS, they were very 
similar with the opinions of the new cadre of military leadership who had been promoted 
by Hellyer himself. In a Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence 
(SCEAND) meeting in February 1967, retired General Charles Foulkes reinforced Allard 
and Hellyer’s views. At this meeting, he told the committee that in future operations 
Canada would be forced to operate with larger allies and that all branches of the armed 
forces would have to be prepared to fit in with air groups, army divisions, and naval 
battle groups.66  
Hellyer and the push for a Tri-Service Force (1964-1965) 
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Despite these opinions from former and current high-ranking military leaders, 
Hellyer was determined to move forward in the Unification process. As its land forces 
were committed to working with the UK and its air and naval forces operating almost 
exclusively with the US, it was abundantly clear that the new CF leadership was going to 
have to find a system that would allow all branches of the military to work together. To 
facilitate this the government would need to choose a primary alliance partner to work 
with, as it could not afford to have two unified forces working separately with both the 
UK and the US. The Pearson government’s choice would be clear from the very 
beginning, as Cabinet argued for the transformation of the armed forces into a new 
formation that would closely resemble the United States Marine Corps.  
Both Pearson and Hellyer’s main goal surrounding Unification was to enhance the 
civilian control of the armed forces and to reduce the inter-service rivalry within the 
military. Hellyer argued that this inter-service rivalry was costing the Defence 
Department millions of dollars every year and by ending it the savings could be used to 
purchase new equipment for all branches of the military.67 However, they had to find a 
new unified organization that would both enhance civilian control but also keep the CF 
visible in the eyes of the country’s largest allies, particularly the US. A new military 
system was soon brought to the attention of Pearson and Hellyer, courtesy of retired 
General Guy Simonds.  
At a 1964 Parliamentary committee, Simonds argued that a tri-service force 
prepared to handle small brush-fire wars and whose organization would be very similar to 
the USMC, which is a highly mobile force, would be best for a country with the 
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population and financial limitations like Canada.68 This concept was pushed further along 
in 1965 by the Army Tactics and Organization Board (ATOB), which concluded that a 
USMC-like concept would allow for two important types of formations the CF needed: 
rapidly deployable light forces for NATO and UN operations, and heavy armoured and 
mechanized units for service in Europe.69 While Simonds did not have direct discussions 
with Hellyer regarding his idea, retired General Charles Foulkes brought it to the 
attention of the Minister.70 With this new idea in hand Hellyer began to look seriously at 
reorganization of the military. 
Hellyer’s proposed Marine Corps organizational scheme for the reorganized 
armed forces became the focal point for the fight against unification in both the military 
and government spheres. However, whether the Minister was serious about the idea or 
not, it was clear to all involved that he was determined to move the military in another 
direction towards closer cooperation with Canada’s southern neighbour. Before this 
objective could be achieved, Hellyer and Pearson would have to ensure that the military 
responded to a civilian developed and controlled defence department. The establishment 
of a new military organization would also need a new integrated command structure, 
which was very appealing to the Liberal Government. 
In order to fully transform the CF and move it towards closer cooperation with the 
US military, Hellyer realized that he would have to increase the civilian leadership of the 
armed forces. He firmly believed that Canadian military leaders used the Minister of 
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National Defence as a puppet to help them achieve their military goals.71 His counterpart 
in the United States, Robert McNamara, had recently overhauled the Pentagon to ensure 
that the civilian government directed defence policy and not the military, which Hellyer 
openly admired.72 Having stand-by units for brush-fire conflicts became an essential 
aspect of Hellyer’s 1964 White Paper on Defence, as he recognized the importance of 
keeping both the US and Soviet militaries away from each other in these small conflicts. 
Both Pearson and Hellyer believed that the large conventional and nuclear forces arrayed 
against each other in Europe were enough to deter either side from attacking the other in 
Europe. However, it was the opinion of the Pearson government that a worldwide conflict 
could escalate from any potential brush-fire conflict in the world if American and Soviet 
military forces were fighting on different sides.73 In the new Defence White Paper, 
Hellyer identified one of the top priorities of the future reorganized force was to be 
peacekeeping. Peacekeeping had become an important element of Pearson’s defence 
policy. Pearson and his government firmly believed that Canada and other middle powers 
must use their military forces to defuse these brush-fire conflicts in the Third World in 
order to prevent a superpower confrontation.74 Even before the 1964 Defence White 
Paper, it was evident that the Canadian military and senior leadership was moving 
towards this new American strategic trend. This became more of a reality to Hellyer as 
both the US and Soviet militaries were preparing and planning for brush-fire conflicts. 
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 Beginning in the early 1960s the Pentagon and Joint Chiefs of Staff began 
investigating ways to create a more flexible, mobile and responsive armed forces that 
could counter any threat in the world immediately. The Pentagon began to stress three 
distinct capabilities: greater strategic mobility, expansion of Special Forces units, and a 
greater air and sea transport capability.75 Meanwhile, the Canadian Army had focused its 
abilities on two realities: air mobility for Arctic defence along with nuclear firepower and 
heavily mechanized forces for Europe.76 However, soon after Hellyer became the new 
Minister of National Defence, a third reality began to slowly creep into Canadian Army 
strategic thinking. The new focus was very similar to that which was adopted by the US 
in 1959, the idea of ‘stand-by battalions’ for operations in short, small brush-fire 
conflicts.77 If he was to have any chance of success in reorganizing the Canadian military, 
Hellyer knew that he would have to look towards the efforts being made in the US 
Department of Defense.  
During the 1964 debate on Unification in Parliament, Hellyer argued that in order 
to achieve the necessary reorganization a civilian leadership in the department, similar to 
that of the US DoD, would be needed: “To achieve this it is essential that there be a 
strong civil staff in the department outside the military chain of command for analyzing 
and reviewing military requirements…”78 Hellyer and Pearson firmly believed that 
Canada’s primary military priority was the protection of the US nuclear deterrent and 
military power, which not only ensured the safety of the US but also of Canada. With this 
objective in mind, Hellyer declared that it was important for the Canadian armed forces 
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to concentrate on building up its conventional forces, which included a strategic air and 
sealift capability in order to provide the land forces with maximum flexibility and 
mobility.79 
As directed by the Minister of National Defence, current and former senior 
leaders and military planners looked towards the new American strategic planning on 
small, mobile forces for Third World conflicts. Former Chief of the General Staff 
General Foulkes identified the Canadian desire to follow this new American strategic 
trend. In his analysis of the new defence policy he argued that there would be a 
movement away from preparing to fight a major war and instead trending towards more 
flexible and mobile roles with the goal of preventing major conflicts breaking out 
anywhere in the world.80 
 Furthermore, in the spring of 1964 Foulkes argued that the new organizational 
scheme would focus the Canadian Armed Forces on two distinct tasks in support of its 
major American ally. These would be the maintenance of a mobile ready reserve force 
available to immediately meet any NATO or UN task and anti-submarine warfare in 
support of the USN in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.81 By focusing on these two major 
military tasks, Hellyer was able to enforce two major goals of the Liberal government: 
support of the American military power and the enforcement of civilian control of the 
Canadian military. In his attempt to rapidly shift the armed forces towards the US 
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military as its main allied partner, Hellyer failed to realize that the Pentagon greatly 
desired the CF to maintain most of its previous capabilities. His new marine-corps 
organization would result in the CF losing parts of its ASW and air defence capabilities, 
which Washington viewed as an important aspect of the defence of North America. 
Upon the announcement in 1964 in the House of Commons that the Canadian 
military would be going under an extensive reorganization, it was immediately clear that 
Hellyer wanted to have the new CF be similar to the USMC. In Hellyer’s opinion this 
idea would help to ‘Canadianize’ the armed forces and provide it with a modern tri-
service organization. However, what Hellyer did not realize was that using an American 
military organization as the structure for this tri-service force was no more Canadian than 
the previous British-oriented Canadian military structure. The Ministry of National 
Defence had made it clear that they were going to create a Mobile Command that would 
operate anywhere in the world and would be transported and supported by Canadian air 
and naval forces. However, the proposed transformation of the military into a USMC-like 
formation would result in the air and naval commands being reduced to a supporting role 
for the land forces and was not well received in these formations. The result was that both 
the navy and air commands moved closer towards their US counterparts in order to help 
them prevent the creation of a Canadian USMC organization. 
While Hellyer insisted that he was not interested in turning the Canadian forces 
into a modified USMC, he was very intrigued with the prospect of the increased mobility 
that this system could have for the land forces. According to many members of the 
Pearson government, it was brush-fire wars in the Third World that were more of a 
danger to creating an east-west conflict than an all-out war in Europe and rapidly 
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deployable military forces were needed to combat these conflicts.82 Once again General 
Simonds was at the forefront when he stated to a Parliamentary committee that a 
“conventionally armed tri-service, highly mobile force adapted to deal with brush-fire 
wars” was the type of military organization Canada needed.83 However, what many 
overlooked was that his statement was very similar to the new strategic military doctrine 
being implemented by the Pentagon in the US Armed Forces at the same time.84 Hellyer 
quietly agreed with this new direction and began to argue for a reshaped Canadian 
military that would echo the changes being made in the US.  
The components of the USMC made it a very unique and powerful force in 
western military circles. The basic components of a marine expeditionary unit, which 
would be the basic component Hellyer would need for operations, consisted of air, naval 
and land units. Its basic component was an infantry battalion supported by small amounts 
of armour and artillery.85 It would be supported in the air by its own transport and attack 
helicopters and multi-role fixed wing aircraft, which were operated by large amphibious 
assault ships.86 Even though it was highly mobile, it could not operate by itself on 
sustained operations and was not a truly integrated force. Simonds himself pointed out to 
elected officials, after being called to provide evidence at a SCEAND meeting, that the 
USMC was a larger part of American military strategy which would go in quickly and 
secure the situation and then be replaced.87 If Mobile Command were to be reorganized 
on a USMC system, there would be nothing left to back it up in these brush-fire wars. 
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Hellyer, however, was more interested in the mobility and rapid deployment capabilities 
of the USMC than its organization and was determined to create a highly mobile 
Canadian military that would be able to support the US and other NATO allies wherever 
needed.  
Since his announcement in 1964 of the government’s intention to unify the armed 
forces, it was clear that Hellyer was attempting to move the military towards creating a 
closer operational capability with the US. He followed this announcement with an intense 
push to have the military adopt a new organizational model based upon that of the 
USMC. In order to transform the Canadian military similar to that of a marine corps, 
Hellyer identified in the 1964 White Paper that the new Air and Maritime Commands 
would have to change their primary goal to that of transporting Mobile Command around 
the globe.88 Soon after the release of the White Paper, he tasked the navy to produce a 
fleet plan that would support his USMC concept.89 For both Air and Maritime Commands 
to adapt to this new concept, they would be forced to cut back on two of Canada’s most 
important alliance commitments, ASW capabilities and air defence of North America.  
ASW and air defence were two important military priorities that caused many in 
the armed forces and Parliament to question Hellyer’s goals. In a Time Magazine article 
in May 1964, these fears regarding the future of Canadian ASW and air defence 
capabilities came to the forefront of the public, and indeed the Pentagon. While the article 
identified that it was Hellyer’s desire to reinforce the Army by having its three Canada-
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based brigades brought up to operational strength, it also identified many troubling trends 
in the new Defence White Paper. One of these was that Hellyer had proposed to replace 
all the RCAF’s CF-101B interceptors with a tactical ground-support aircraft, while the 
remainder of the RCAF would be transformed into a Transport Command.90 Furthermore, 
the Navy would receive troop transport ships similar to the USMC Iwo Jima Class.91 This 
was further emphasized when Hellyer stated in a 1966 Parliamentary debate that the 
primary ingredients of this new force were “quick reaction time, the ability to go where 
required with dispatch, and to perform its tasks with maximum effectiveness.”92 The 
article made clear that while Hellyer would be forced to sacrifice some important military 
commitments in order to achieve his two main goals, saving money and integrating the 
armed forces.  
Despite Hellyer’s desire to acquire this new equipment for his proposed tri-
service force, the equipment was simply too expensive for Canada’s defence budget to 
bear. To purchase a fleet of 250 F-4 Phantoms, which Hellyer had proposed to become 
the new tactical strike aircraft of the air force, would cost in the range of $600 million-$1 
billion (US), while the purchase of a single Iwo Jima class amphibious assault ship would 
require the Navy’s budget to sharply rise from the $277 million it received in 1964.93 
With the large costs of these potential new equipment purchases and the desire by much 
of Pearson’s Cabinet, notably Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin Sr., to 
create a distinctly Canadian military, the idea of adopting a USMC organization for the 
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CF was scrapped by Hellyer by late 1965. By 1966 Hellyer had removed all thoughts of a 
USMC style reorganization, stating in his memoirs that he totally rejected a 1966 CBC 
report, which stated the name of the future unified force would be called the Royal 
Canadian Marine Corps.94 
Military Pressure to Alter Unification Strategies (1965-1967) 
While the USMC model for the CF was debated in Parliament and Defence 
headquarters, it showed a rapidly developing relationship between the two armed forces 
in order to enable the CF to combat the increasing demands placed on it by Hellyer. This 
relationship is signified by the increasing concerns of Washington and the Pentagon in 
Hellyer’s reorganization of the military and their solidarity with the different branches of 
the military, which enabled the CF to maintain many of its previous operational 
objectives. 
Hellyer’s announcement of a newly unified armed forces that would be based 
around Mobile Command with a strategic air and naval transport capability caused 
immense anger and trouble within the Air and Maritime Commands. Air Command 
wanted to ensure that its main goal was air defence with tactical interceptor aircraft, 
while Maritime Command resisted any attempt by Hellyer to remove its main capability 
of anti-submarine warfare. In order to ensure that these capabilities would remain a 
crucial objective of any unified Canadian military, both commands began to look towards 
the US armed forces for support in combating Hellyer’s reforms. This support was not 
long in coming and helped both commands to retain their important capabilities. 
However, it also signified the first time that the CF looked towards the US for military 
assistance.  
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It was clear that Hellyer was trying to push the military towards an increased 
relationship with their American counterparts. What he could not have foreseen was how 
this continental defence relationship could help the military stunt his future plans for the 
Canadian military. Throughout his tenure as Minister of National Defence, Hellyer 
argued that Canadian defence was tied in with that of the United States in a collective 
North American partnership.95 As a result, the different branches of the CF began to 
closely cooperate with their American allies. Air Command and Maritime Command 
were rapidly eyeing the USN and USAF as important allies in their fight with Hellyer 
over equipment, strategies and international objectives.  
In 1964 Prime Minister Pearson agreed to a number of American proposals that 
would lead to direct interaction between the two militaries. First, Pearson agreed to a 
controversial USAF dispersal plan that was pushed on him by the RCAF. This plan 
would see the USAF deploy between four and eight interceptor aircraft at a number of 
Canadian military installations on a permanent, rotational basis.96 Not only would this 
plan improve NORAD’s defensive posture but it would also force the Canadian 
government to retain its own interceptor capability.97 This was important, as it would 
ensure the US that the RCAF was also participating in NORAD and capable of defending 
Canadian airspace. Furthermore, Pearson’s agreement to this American proposal 
prevented Hellyer from completely eliminating the air defence capability of the air force. 
This was followed on 7 October 1964 by Pearson’s announcement that the two countries 
had come to an agreement that would allow the USAF to store nuclear air-to-air weapons 
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at bases in Newfoundland and Labrador.98 Once again, Pearson and Hellyer were shown 
the importance of maintaining a credible Canadian air defence capability by the 
importance the USAF was placing on it. These two agreements also showed that the 
RCAF’s desire to work with the USAF in North American air defence, as the RCAF 
needed the support of the much larger USAF to properly defend Canadian airspace. 
With the creation of NORAD, American and Canadian fighter squadrons had 
been working closely together with the common goal of protecting the US nuclear and 
conventional military deterrent. When the White Paper on Defence was released in 1964 
and Hellyer proposed to remove the interceptors from the air force’s inventory and 
replace them with ground support and transport aircraft, the air force leadership used the 
NORAD agreement as the basis of their defence against Hellyer’s proposal. Retired 
RCAF Major-General Leonard Johnson showed how close the two air forces were when 
he stated that, “The U.S. Air Force was a big and powerful cousin with whom we 
identified.”99 Furthermore, the USAF wanted the new Air Command to maintain, and 
indeed strengthen, its air defence capability, as this would enable the USAF to focus its 
resources and efforts on other parts of the globe.  
During a Parliamentary debate regarding unification in February 1966, Minister 
Hellyer made evident the role that the USAF wanted Air Command to play in US-
Canadian defence relations. Hellyer argued the importance of Canada’s purchase of the 
new US C-130 transport aircraft as the USAF had offered to refuel the aircraft when they 
were deployed in exchange for Air Command taking on a larger role in transporting US 
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personnel and equipment.100 This was followed in a fall 1966 meeting of Parliament, 
when Progressive Conservative MP Jack Bigg identified that it was important for Air 
Command to work closely with the USAF. Bigg argued that while the USAF allows for 
Canadian personnel to assist them at SAC headquarters in the defence of North America, 
Hellyer was pushing the air force towards complete independence and not towards 
assisting the USAF in the common defence of both nations.101  
The developing relationship between the two North American armed forces was 
not limited to the air forces. Unlike the air force, which had been gradually moving 
towards the US since the end of the Second World War, the Canadian Army also began 
to slowly move towards the United States. When the Liberal Government was elected in 
1963 the Canadian Army found that its rich British history and traditions were coming 
under fire by the ambitious new Minister of National Defence. While the Army had been 
slowly pushed towards closer cooperation with their US counterparts through the gradual 
adoption of American equipment, strategies and training regimes, they managed to 
maintain their British traditions. With the release of the White Paper and sensing the 
direction that the CF was being pushed, the Army began to look toward the US as their 
main alliance partner. Retired Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, former Chief of the 
General Staff, saw the writing on the wall in 1965 and believed that the Army’s main 
concern was the defence of North America, which would demand much closer liaison 
with the American Army.102 Admiral Brock echoed this stance and other members of the 
Canadian military leadership who all believed that the Government’s new focus on North 
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American security would lead to increased cooperation with the Pentagon. Brock himself 
stated that the “territorial integrity of North America can only be guaranteed if Canada 
can depend on the powerful forces of the United States…and the United States can 
depend on whole hearted Canadian support of all U.S. military measures…”103 The 
Canadian Army was indeed moving closer to the United States in not only the defence of 
North America but also in the adoption and development of close, unofficial ties between 
the two. 
Despite Hellyer’s desire to transform the Army into a light and highly mobile 
force, the officers and enlisted personnel of the Army wanted to maintain many of their 
existing capabilities. As Hellyer was rapidly attempting to ‘Canadianize’ the armed 
forces, the Army was accidentally moved towards greater cooperation with the US. As a 
result of Hellyer’s proposals, the Canadian Army began to look towards the US Army for 
assistance in maintaining its capabilities, which they believed were necessary for both the 
defence of North America and Western Europe. Hellyer made it clear that the Army must 
be prepared to assist the civil power, fight small brush-fire conflicts, participate in UN 
operations and prepare to fight the Soviets in Europe.104 However, the Army would be 
hard-pressed to provide forces for all of these objectives. In his memoirs, General Allard 
recognized that the Americans greatly helped the Canadian Army reorganize itself into a 
more mobile force with Unification. US Army personnel helped train their Canadian 
counterparts on the M113 APC, the M109 self-propelled howitzer and the numerous anti-
aircraft and anti-tank systems purchased from the US by Ottawa.105 Furthermore, Allard 
                                                103	  Admiral	  J.	  Brock,	  “National	  Defence-­‐	  A	  Policy	  Position	  Paper,”	  File	  10	  “Rear	  Admiral	  J.	  Brock,	  1966”,	  Volume	  68,	  PHP,	  LAC,	  page	  4	  of	  document.	  
104 Horn, From Cold War to New Millennium, 69. 
105 Allard, The Memoirs of Jean V. Allard, 222. 
 46 
stated that the US Army greatly assisted the Canadian Militia in the rearmament of all 
their armour, artillery and infantry regiments and also helped assist them in the training 
of this new equipment.106 According to Allard, Brigadier J.W. Bennett, the Canadian 
representative to the US Army, was instrumental to the relationship between the 
Canadian and American armies. Brigadier Bennett consulted between Allard and the US 
Army high command to ensure that both armies remained on the same wavelength.107 
Soon after Allard’s promotion to CDS cooperation between Mobile Command and the 
American Army began to develop through official training exercises. 
Although the odds of a successful Soviet land invasion of North America in the 
late 1960s were very slim, the potential threat pushed Mobile Command and the US 
Army together. The emergence of the Soviet threat and the creation of NATO brought the 
two armies into a close alliance for the first time in peacetime.108 The Army began to 
send its forces to the US for specific training operations. Soon after unification was 
announced, the Army began to send personnel to American training centres to be trained 
as helicopter pilots and learn ground support tactics.109 The Royal Canadian Regiment 
found itself being sent to the US for training with American Army Rangers on how to 
fight on a nuclear battlefield.110 Hellyer himself had an important part to play in this 
increased cooperation. The Minister identified to Parliament in December 1966 that the 
creation of mobile divisions with helicopter transport by the US was a new way for 
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mobile army units to be structured and one in which he fully supported.111 If the Army 
were to be reorganized along these lines then they would have to train in these types of 
amphibious and mobile operations. As a result, numerous infantry, armour and artillery 
regiments were sent to participate with light US infantry divisions, as well as the USMC 
in both North America and Western Europe.112   
All of this led to the creation of formal annual defence exercises between the two 
armed forces. Beginning in 1965 the Canadian Army began formal cooperation with their 
American counterparts through annual Canada/United States (CANUS) operations and 
training exercises. The object of many of these operations was to create an environment 
that would allow the smaller Canadian forces to operate within the framework of a much 
large American military force, either in a UN mission or to combat Soviet forces in 
Western Europe.113 The cooperation and contacts developed through these exercises was 
astounding, even to Hellyer, who soon saw the development of a fruitful and intertwined 
North American defence relationship within the two militaries. It was at these exercises 
that cooperation between the two allies really began to take hold in both militaries. It also 
caused intense debate within the Government and among the public about the close 
relations that were being rapidly expanded between both armed forces. It also led to a 
reversal of some of Hellyer’s reforms and a rethinking of Canada’s future security 
environment.  
In 1964 Hellyer had identified in his Defence White Paper that he wanted the 
military to focus more on peacekeeping activities and Third World conflicts. This was 
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followed by his attempt to recreate the armed forces as a light mobile force that could be 
used to help combat so-called brush-fire wars. Even though he was attempting to move 
the military closer towards the US, he had also identified that North American defence 
would be the second or third main priority for the armed forces. In his attempt to move 
the defence department and the armed forces towards the US, he found himself changing 
Canadian defence policies to recognize the new realities concerning Canada’s military 
status.  
In a memorandum to the Defence Department in 1967 Hellyer identified Canada’s 
new position in regards to its cooperation with the US military. He stated that the 
government believed that it was necessary to continue with the close military association 
that had developed with the United States since the end of the Second World War.114 He 
then argued that “Most of the bilateral agreements and arrangements by which Canada 
has accepted obligations in the field of cooperative defence have been concluded between 
Canada and the United States.”115 While his statements caused much internal discussion 
within the Government, Hellyer was simply reacting to the close defence ties that had 
been created between the two countries since his appointment to the Minister of National 
Defence. 
Hellyer’s views on participation with the US were not only his own but were 
echoed by many elected Members of Parliament in debates that would last until the 
elevation of Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the position of Prime Minister in 1968. In an 
interview with General Simonds at a spring 1967 SCEAND meeting, Progressive 
Conservative MP Donald MacInnis echoed the opinions of Minister Hellyer concerning 
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the future relationship between the Canadian and American militaries. MacInnis argued 
that if Canada was going to cooperate with the US military in the defence of North 
America and the West, then Canadian units should be assigned to US units in order to 
“assimilate our forces and our efforts with theirs.”116 Furthermore, Progressive 
Conservative MP Heber Smith pointed out that Canada had two essential truths to its 
national defence in the post-war world. “The first,” Heber noted, “is that the defence of 
our country will always depend on others, primarily the United States. The second is that 
the defence of our principles must also depend on others.”117 Both of these ‘truths’, he 
believed, rested on the fact that the US and Canada must be willing to support their 
primary ally when necessary. However, he also cautioned that Canada could not just hand 
over its defence to the Americans but it must contribute to its own defence at the best of 
its ability with the fact in mind that Canada would be dependent on others to assist in her 
defence.118  
On 18 September 1967, Leo Cadieux as the Minister of National Defence 
replaced Paul Hellyer. With the removal of Hellyer from the Defence portfolio, the 
military settled down and began to focus on developing their future capabilities. While 
these opinions and arguments were heavily debated in the House of Commons, the 
predominant views from these sessions were beginning to be pushed upon the armed 
forces, which would see even greater cooperation with the US armed forces in the 
coming decades. 
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Conclusion 
The 1963 federal election signaled a drastic shift in the Canadian armed forces. 
With the election of Lester B. Pearson as the new Prime Minister and his subsequent 
appointment of Paul Hellyer as the Minister of National Defence, the Canadian military 
found itself being pushed in a new direction, towards the US and away from their 
traditional British military allies. As the 1960s came to a close it was clear that Hellyer’s 
rush to unify the armed forces and create a distinctly Canadian military had instead 
forced the new Canadian Forces into closer cooperation with the United States military. 
Hellyer’s views on participation with the US were echoed by many elected Members of 
the Official Opposition in Parliamentary debates that would last until the election of 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau as Prime Minister.  
In the attempt to eliminate as many of the British military traditions as possible, 
the Pearson Government failed to provide the CF with adequate Canadian military 
traditions. Soon this resulted in the adoption of American military traditions by the 
Canadian military chain of command. The elimination of the British traditions was soon 
followed by Hellyer’s announcement that the three branches of the Canadian military 
were to be reorganized into a unified force, which was to be a distinctly Canadian 
experiment. However, Hellyer wanted to reorganize the newly unified force into a force 
similar to the USMC. In the end this proposal was widely rejected by Canadian 
politicians, the public, and the military officials who all did not want the CF to become a 
small part of the larger American military.  
Finally, the RCN, RCAF and Army all began to work more closely with their 
American counterparts, as they feared that Unification would eliminate many of their 
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combat capabilities. The senior cadre of Canadian military leadership worked with the 
Americans to ensure that the US provided the CF with a decent counterbalance to 
Canadian politicians in Ottawa, which would enable the CF to retain a significant voice 
in Ottawa. With the election of Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968, the CF found that all the 
roles and preparations it had made for unification were outdated and not functional with 
the new Prime Minister. All the cooperation that the CF had developed with the US 
would have to be fully utilized and expanded during the next decade, which was to signal 
tough times for the CF. 
Since the appointment of Paul Hellyer as the Minister of National Defence in 
1964, the Canadian armed forces underwent numerous drastic changes. In a relatively 
short five-year period Hellyer and the remainder of Pearson’s federal Cabinet rapidly 
changed the CF identity from that of one closely aligned to the UK and Commonwealth, 
to one slowly being pushed towards the shadow of the United States military. However, 
this was not brought about by members of either the US or Canadian armed forces but by 
the federal government of Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson. Pearson and his 
Cabinet had begun to push the Canadian military towards adopting the models, strategies, 
and equipment of the US military. They did this in order for Canada to both gain a larger 
voice in Washington and to move the military away from the UK, which had been an 
election goal of the Pearson administration for all sectors of the Canadian federal 
government. While the Liberal government of Pearson did not envision that the Canadian 
military would be pushed towards closer cooperation with the US because of their 
actions, this inevitably became the case as the Canadian military had always worked 
within larger alliances and had always had a primary alliance partner to assist. By 
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implementing these changes in the Canadian Armed Forces the Pearson administration 
was able to reduce both the size and costs of the defence department. Secondly, Pearson’s 
Cabinet believed that by beginning a change from traditional UK military models to a 
newer North American model would ensure Washington that Ottawa was taking the 
defence of the continent and the West seriously into the coming decades.  
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Chapter Two 
Pierre Trudeau and the Canadian Forces, 1968-1979 
 
Unification was made official in early 1967, and the different branches of the 
Armed Forces were molded together into the Canadian Forces. Soon after, however, 
Prime Minister Pearson announced his retirement from politics, which forced the Liberal 
Party to begin looking for his replacement. On 20 April 1968, this search came to an end 
when Pierre Elliott Trudeau was announced as the new leader of the Party and, therefore, 
as the new Canadian Prime Minister. While the Trudeau administration began to 
influence the new CF in some fashion almost immediately, it began to put its full stamp 
on the military when it had a firm grasp in Ottawa beginning in 1970. The Canadian 
Forces of the 1970s under the leadership of Trudeau was marked by the development of 
increasingly closer ties with the American military, due in large part to the constantly 
changing defence policies of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.  
Under the leadership of Paul Hellyer and Lester Pearson, the CF had been 
transformed into a military organization that was to signify the next evolution of Western 
military organization. It had also found itself torn away from its traditional ties with the 
United Kingdom and pushed towards an increasing relationship with the United States. 
While the CF was still reeling from its rapid transformation, Trudeau proceeded to turn 
Canadian defence priorities upside down, which only increased confusion within the 
military. Trudeau’s security and defence policies during the 1970s forced the CF to look 
towards the US military for assistance in some of its new priorities and to help combat 
the rapid deterioration of the armed forces under the Trudeau Government. 
Upon taking office in 1968 Trudeau soon found that he would not be able to pull 
the CF away from the United States and instead found himself striving to increase 
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cooperation between the two armed forces in the defence of North America. Beginning in 
1971, when it saw its primary goal of preparing for war against the Warsaw Pact 
downgraded in favour of protecting sovereignty, the CF created increasingly cooperative 
strategies with the US military in order to give the military a voice in the Trudeau 
Government. This cooperation was significantly strengthened during the early 1970s 
through the similar world-views and the difficulties that both armed forces were having 
in communicating with their respective governments.119 Maritime Command found itself 
continuing to work closely with the USN in ASW Operations, while both Mobile and Air 
Commands worked with their American counterparts to prepare for war against the 
Warsaw Pact and the defence of North American territory.120 Officers within both Air 
and Mobile Commands developed increasing ties with the USAF and US Army because 
of the looming cutbacks that they were sure would soon follow the release of the 1971 
Defence White Paper. It was soon discovered that this ongoing cooperation between the 
two armed forces would provide Trudeau with a significant obstacle while he attempted 
to focus Canadian defence resources solely on sovereignty protection. 
 In late 1969 the Trudeau Government announced a new set of objectives for the 
CF during the coming decade. The government formally declared that the military’s main 
purpose was to be the protection of Canadian sovereignty, not preparation for war in 
Europe and assistance to NATO. By demanding that the CF focus on sovereignty 
protection, Trudeau was inadvertently pushing the CF closer to the United States. If the 
CF was focused on sovereignty, the Trudeau Cabinet believed it could reduce the costs 
and manpower of the military and redirect these resources to other government 
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objectives. However, as Canada is such a large country, it could not hope to protect all of 
its airspace and waterways with a decreased budget and manpower without the assistance 
of the US military, which also happened to be the largest threat to Canadian sovereignty.  
Sovereignty protection was only one part of a larger defence policy that Trudeau’s 
Cabinet had envisioned for the CF. One of the most fundamental defence objectives that 
the Trudeau Government held throughout the 1970s was the belief that the cornerstone of 
Western defence was the large US nuclear and conventional military force. Therefore, 
throughout the 1970s Trudeau and his Cabinet argued that another important goal for the 
CF was to help protect these US forces from any Soviet incursion into North American 
airspace and waterways. Through increased cooperation in NORAD and between 
Maritime Command and the USN, the CF would be able to better protect North America 
from any hostile incursion. Furthermore, Trudeau himself firmly believed that any 
conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would quickly escalate to nuclear warfare 
and that conventional forces were not important, as they would not make a big difference 
in a nuclear conflict. As a result of the switch to sovereignty protection and the 
Government’s desire to assist the US in the protection of their nuclear deterrent, the CF 
were placed under even greater strains and were forced to work even more closely with 
the US military than they had under Hellyer. Forces in both North America and Europe 
had to develop joint capabilities with their American counterparts to achieve both of 
Trudeau’s military objectives with smaller relative budgets and reduced manpower at 
their disposal. Reallocation of forces to North American defence and vast reductions in 
capabilities, manpower and equipment led the CF to look towards the US for assistance 
in completing many of the objectives assigned by Trudeau.  
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In a situation similar to what occurred under the leadership of Paul Hellyer and 
Lester Pearson, the new Liberal Government in Ottawa was inadvertently pushing the CF 
into greater cooperation with the US military. Once again, this was not brought about by 
US military and government officials, although they did express satisfaction in these 
moves, but by the elected Canadian officials in Ottawa from whom the CF took its 
orders. While at first the Trudeau Government was more concerned with protecting 
Canadian sovereign airspace and waterways from US military incursions they soon began 
to realize that the small CF could not hope to protect all of Canada’s sovereignty without 
support from the much larger US armed forces. As a result, Trudeau and his Cabinet 
began to look at ways to bring the CF into even greater cooperation with their southern 
neighbours in order for the Trudeau Government to gain a seat at the NATO head table 
with the US. 
The 1971 Defence White Paper and Canadian Defence Policy in the 1970s 
Since the end of the Second World War and the creation of NATO in 1949, the 
Canadian military had focused its primary efforts on preparing for a conventional and/or 
nuclear war in Europe. This had remained the CF’s main objective for much of the early 
Cold War, including the tumultuous Hellyer Unification years. However, in early 1970 
the new Trudeau Government quickly made this goal a secondary one to that of 
sovereignty protection. The Trudeau Cabinet’s implementation of sovereignty protection 
was part of their firm belief that the defence of North America and that of Western 
Europe through NATO were arbitrarily separated from each other.121 According to J.L. 
Granatstein, sovereignty is exercised by acting in the national interest, and by meeting 
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treaty obligations that previous Canadian governments had entered into.122 The Trudeau 
Cabinet completely revamped Canadian defence policy in order to give Canada greater 
control of its armed forces, much like what Hellyer and Pearson sought to do. However, 
similar to his predecessor, by revamping the CF and its defence priorities, Trudeau was 
moving the military into even closer cooperation with the US armed forces. The furious 
debate that raged within Trudeau’s Cabinet in the lead up to the release of the 1971 White 
Paper showed the change in Canada’s military objectives that Trudeau and Donald 
Macdonald, his defence minister, demanded. 
The politicians within Trudeau’s Cabinet between 1968-1971 were often far 
removed from the internationalism that had driven the government policies of the 
previous Liberal government under Lester Pearson. On 24 September 1970, Trudeau 
reshuffled his Cabinet and made Donald Macdonald the new Minister of National 
Defence.123 Historian Douglas Bland argues that the new Defence Minister sought to 
“change, redirect, or eliminate altogether Canada’s ongoing international military 
commitments.”124 Both Trudeau and Macdonald fought to convince skeptical members of 
the Trudeau government that Canada’s defence policies needed to be redirected back 
towards North America and away from Europe and United Nations missions. Two of the 
foremost opponents of Trudeau’s proposed defence policies were Mitchell Sharp and 
Charles Drury, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the President of the 
Treasury Board, respectively. 
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Throughout the Cabinet discussions prior to the release of the White Paper, 
Macdonald sought to keep the focus on economic issues, mainly the need for additional 
funds to allow the government to pay for new social welfare systems being implemented 
throughout Canada. By keeping the focus on the economic issues, Macdonald was able to 
undertake the decision made by Trudeau to reduce Canadian overseas military personnel 
by half.125 However, it was not only the overseas military that was reduced, but also the 
entire military as a whole suffered from stagnating defence budgets for most of the 
1970s. The following chart illustrates the defence budget from 1967-68 through to the 
end of the 1970s 
 
 
National Defence Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1968-1980126 
 
Year 
Total Dollars (in 
millions) % of GDP 
% of Total Government 
Expenses 
1967-68 $1,842 2.60% 15.40% 
1968-69 $1,875 2.50% 14.40% 
1969-70 $1,892 2.30% 12.90% 
1970-71 $1,932 2.10% 11.80% 
1971-72 $2,019 2.10% 10.70% 
1972-73 $2,096 1.90% 9.70% 
1973-74 $2,377 1.80% 9.40% 
1974-75 $2,722 1.80% 8.50% 
1975-76 $3,163 1.80% 8.20% 
1976-77 $3,564 1.80% 8.40% 
1977-78 $3,981 1.80% 8.60% 
1978-79 $4,315 1.80% 8.40% 
1979-80 $4,588 1.60% 8.30% 
 
As a result of the stagnating defence budget the CF were forced to vastly reduce the 
number of trained personnel. In 1966 the CF consisted of 107,467 personnel, but this had 
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fallen to 79,738 personnel by 1976.127 With a plan to both reduce the relative percentage 
of funds available to the Ministry of Defence and the manpower of the military, the 
resulting debates that preceded the release of the 1971 White Paper revolved around two 
important elements: a) the future role of the Canadian Forces in Europe, and b) Canada’s 
role in North American defence. 
 Since Trudeau’s election to the Liberal Party leadership and Prime Minister in 
1968, it became clear to all Canadians that he was going to turn his focus towards social 
welfare benefits for the Canadian people. This was in stark contrast to the 
internationalism that the previous Liberal government under Pearson had espoused. 
Within this larger goal of Trudeau’s was a need to bring the Canadian military under the 
strict control of the government. As a result, one of the primary objectives of the 1971 
White Paper was to ‘free’ the Minister of National Defence from dependence on military 
advice and provide a new process for determining what defence requirements were 
important.128 According to Douglas Bland, Macdonald found the military assessments of 
their operational requirements unacceptable and was determined to have these 
assessments changed from the control of the military to that of civil servants.129 By 
accomplishing these two simple objectives, Macdonald and Trudeau were attempting to 
gain control of defence spending, which would enable them to keep the defence budget 
stagnant and, therefore, enable any saved funds from Defence to be redirected towards 
the government’s social welfare plans. As a result, the debates around the White Paper 
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revolved around Canada’s two main, and most expensive, military goals: participation in 
NORAD and NATO. 
 One of the important themes of the new White Paper and the debates leading up 
to its release was the emphasis placed on a rebuilt Europe by Trudeau. At a Cabinet 
meeting on 30 March 1969, Trudeau argued with the then Minister of National Defence, 
Leo Cadieux, that a Canadian military presence was no longer needed in Europe, as 
Western European countries had successfully undergone a dramatic economic and 
military recovery.130 Indeed, in September 1970 Macdonald argued to Cabinet that as 
Europe was now prosperous, it no longer needed Canadian assistance to help defend it.131 
However, what Macdonald and much of the Cabinet failed to realize was that the CF 
were built primarily around their responsibilities towards NATO. In 1971 the military 
viewed the commitments to NATO and NORAD as the justification for modern military 
equipment.132 Taking away this NATO objective would have a profound impact upon the 
morale, identity and shape of the Canadian Forces.  
During Cabinet meetings leading up to the release of the White Paper, the role 
and shape of the Canadian military contribution to Europe was heavily discussed. By July 
1971 Trudeau and Macdonald were prepared to make significant changes to both 
4CMBG and the Canadian air component stationed in Europe. Macdonald stated that the 
new White Paper would make it clear that 4CMBG would be changed from a heavily 
mechanized force to a light, air-portable brigade that would be ideally suited for 
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reconnaissance operations for US forces in CENTAG.133 In order to accomplish this goal, 
4CMBG would be reduced by fifty percent and its main battle tanks would be replaced 
by light armoured vehicles suited more to reconnaissance than defending against heavily 
mechanized forces.134 Not only would the land component need to be changed, but also 
the government would have to make significant changes to the air component to ensure 
that it fit a similar model. 
Trudeau wanted a similar role for the Canadian air component in Europe. He 
instructed Macdonald to reduce the air component to two squadrons of reconnaissance 
aircraft, which would require the removal of all of the Canadian CF-104 Starfighter 
interceptors from Europe.135 Furthermore, these two squadrons would be limited to 
ground-support missions for 4CMBG and would not participate in any strike missions 
with other NATO aircraft against Warsaw Pact forces.136 Both of these reductions were 
intended to remove a significant amount of the combat capabilities of the Canadian 
Forces Europe (CFE) to ensure that the CF were in tune with the Trudeau Cabinet’s 
defence policy, which was to be a strictly defensive one with no first-strike capabilities. 
This overarching defence policy also had a large impact on the other major theme of the 
White Paper, the defence of North America. 
Throughout 1970 Trudeau’s Cabinet argued over the defence of North America. 
Macdonald and Trudeau contended that defence expenditures should be focused on areas 
where there were real threats to Canadian sovereignty, and they suggested that to do this 
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Canada did not need anti-bomber interceptors or defence systems to accomplish this 
sovereignty protection.137 However, this view was not shared by all within Trudeau’s 
Cabinet and was vocally opposed by the President of the Treasury Board, Charles Drury. 
At these debates Drury argued that these same interceptors did indeed protect Canadian 
sovereignty. He stated that if Canada did not contribute these interceptors to NORAD 
“than it was possible that the United States would take over military control of that 
activity, at the expense of Canadian sovereignty.”138 Eventually, by the final White Paper 
debates in July 1971, Drury’s argument won over Trudeau and the Cabinet, who 
acquiesced to retain interceptors to ensure that the US would not take control of the air 
defence of the entire continent. 
However, while Trudeau and Macdonald were concerned about US violations of 
Canadian sovereignty, they also recognized Canada’s role in defending the US nuclear 
retaliatory forces. At a June 1970 Cabinet meeting, Macdonald made it clear that Canada 
had a responsibility to assist the US in protecting its nuclear forces. He further suggested 
at this meeting that the strategic concept for Canadian defence in the 1970s had to be 
examined to ensure that the CF could provide the best possible contributions to alerting 
and protecting the US nuclear forces.139 However, Trudeau cautioned Macdonald that 
Canadian co-operation in the 1970s should only be conducted as a “contribution to the 
defensive second strike strategy” and not if there was any indication of the US 
implementing a first-strike option.140 With the Cabinet in agreement on the initiatives to 
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be undertaken regarding the defence of North America and the reductions to be made to 
CFE, Macdonald was instructed to immediately prepare the 1971 White Paper for release 
to Parliament and the public. This document was to be a defining element of Canada’s 
defence relations with the US throughout the decade. 
The 1971 Defence White Paper, Defence in the 70s, signaled the direction that the 
Liberal Government was going to take with the CF throughout the remainder of the 
decade. Defence Minister Macdonald listed the four main objectives that the CF was to 
be geared towards. The two most important needed to involve direct cooperation and 
consultation with the US military to be successful: a) the sovereignty and surveillance of 
Canada’s territory and coastline, and b) the defence of North America in conjunction with 
the United States.141 Meanwhile NATO and UN operations were downgraded to 
secondary goals in the new White Paper. In order to conduct their new sovereignty 
protection role, the CF were to work closely with their US counterparts, as the defence of 
North America was important to both countries. 
Since the beginning of the Cold War the US had become of the largest violators 
of Canadian sovereignty. Through the SAC Overflight Agreement and NORAD, USAF 
aircraft were legally enabled to patrol parts of Canadian airspace, mainly in southern 
Ontario and British Columbia, in any period of heightened international tensions.142 
However, USN attack submarines and surface warships often patrolled Canada’s claimed 
Arctic waters without the authority of the Canadian government. As a result, Trudeau’s 
sovereignty protection role for the CF was designed, primarily, to show Washington that 
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the CF was capable in assisting the US in the defence of the continent143 and that it was in 
Canada’s best interests to “defend itself from unwanted help from its southern 
neighbor.”144 In order to prevent this unwanted help, Trudeau realized that the CF would 
have to work closely with the United States to help ensure that US security concerns in 
North America were in sync with Canadian military priorities.145  
Unbeknownst to many in the public in the early 1970s was that Canada could not 
simply defend its own sovereignty, as Canadian and American military objectives and 
treaties had made the defence of both countries interwoven and not separated by national 
boundaries. The CF was no longer responsible for just the defence of Canada but had 
become part of an intertwined defence structure designed to defend all of North America. 
This had been made clear as early as 1967 by Canadian Rear-Admiral William 
Landymore. At a Standing Committee on National Defence meeting, Admiral Landymore 
discussed in great length the problems that future Canadian governments would have in 
protecting Canadian sovereignty from their larger southern neighbour. Despite this 
meeting occurring well before Pierre Trudeau’s rise to Prime Minister, Landymore’s 
argument effectively portrayed how the defence of North America was conducted during 
most of the 1970’s. 
 Landymore argued that the defence of the continent was an interwoven defence 
network created by both countries so that Canada and the United States would be able to 
easily assist each other in the event of a major military conflict.146 Admiral Landymore 
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made it clear to the elected representatives that the US took responsibility for the defence 
of parts of Canada, while the CF took responsibility for defending segments of the US.147 
The interwoven defence of the continent forced Trudeau to ensure that the CF cooperated 
closely with their US counterparts. While he wanted the military to focus on sovereignty 
protection, he also had to ensure that his Government lived up to the many defence 
agreements designed between the two allies to defend North America. 
While Canada and the United States had created a number of treaties and defence 
plans to determine how the continent could best be defended, the most critical to both 
American security and Canadian sovereignty concerns during the 1970s was the Basic 
Security Plan (BSP). The BSP became an extremely important agreement as it began to 
impact almost all of the Trudeau Cabinet’s defence objectives involving Canadian and 
North American security, including ensuring Canadian sovereignty from the growing US 
military power. The BSP was created in 1946 and had been reshaped throughout the 
1950s and 1960s to help meet emerging military threats to North America. However, the 
BSP presented a major problem to Trudeau’s sovereignty protection role, as the 
agreement formally recognized that the defence of North America was effectively 
intertwined and was not easily separated.148 Unlike previous and future military 
agreements between the two countries, the BSP provided the senior military leadership of 
both countries with the opportunity and ability to develop frameworks and procedures for 
operational coordination and cooperation without the intervention of civil servants.149 
Similar to his predecessors, it was becoming clear to Trudeau that the only way to satisfy 
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the security needs of the United States and ensure his political objective of Canadian 
sovereignty was to push the CF into much closer cooperation with the much larger US 
military. 
While many in both Parliament and the general public believed that Trudeau was 
determined to remove the Canadian military from its commitments with their US ally, he 
was in fact increasing this cooperation by having the Canadian Armed Forces becoming 
more focused on North American defence. This began to force the CF to spend more of 
their time working with the US than with their European allies in NATO. Air defence had 
effectively been governed by a series of agreements with the US over the previous thirty 
years, while naval policy was based on contributing to American naval supremacy and a 
similarity of maritime interests held by both Ottawa and Washington.150  
The 1971 White Paper clearly showed that Trudeau was not prepared to 
completely withdraw the CF from any of their commitments with the US. In regards to 
the land defence of North America, the document stated that “In the event of a 
requirement to defend the land mass of North America, a mutual support arrangement 
exists with the United States.”151 With this statement the government had effectively tied 
the defence of Canadian territory to the US military. To focus such a large effort on one 
goal, the Trudeau Cabinet would be forced to either increase relative military spending or 
withdraw from other military commitments. With this in mind many military officials 
began to question Trudeau’s policies, believing that he intended to withdraw forces from 
Europe in order to address the glaring military dominance that the US held in North 
America. While this imbalance did not concern leaders in the Canadian military, who 
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argued that the US military truly respected Canadian attitudes and sovereignty, it was a 
significant concern in Parliament and among the general populace of Canada.  
Reduced NATO Commitments and Americanization of Canadian Forces in Europe 
Trudeau had made it abundantly clear in his 1968 election campaign that he 
believed that the military was being used wastefully in Western Europe. He argued that 
these units could instead be used to defend Canadian territory and help provide internal 
security rather than being sent on missions across the globe.152 With the new shakeup in 
defence priorities, Trudeau began to attempt to withdraw the CF units that were on 
NATO duty defending Western Europe. Since he had been elected, he had sought to end 
the Canadian land force commitment to NATO. However, it soon became clear that 
neither the US nor their European allies would allow him to withdraw Canada’s military 
commitment to Europe. To get around this European concern, Trudeau had decided in 
1969 that in order to significantly reduce the permanent Canadian presence in Europe, he 
would commit a Canadian Air/Sea Transportable Brigade (CAST) that would be shipped 
to Northern Europe if East-West hostilities escalated.153 Much to the annoyance of the 
senior Canadian and American military leaders, this force would be permanently 
stationed in Canada and not Europe. 
 By the beginning of 1972 all of Canada’s land forces in Europe had been 
transferred from the BAOR to the US Central Army Group (CENTAG). While the CAST 
Brigade had been accepted as early as 1968, it was not until after the 1971 White Paper 
that the federal government began to tinker with the idea that the CAST commitment 
could be used as a strategy to replace Canada’s permanent air and land forces in Europe. 
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This came as a shock to both American and Canadian military officials, as they had 
focused much of their efforts on defending West Germany within CENTAG. It came as a 
special shock to US military officials, who had helped National Defence Headquarters 
(NDHQ) create the CAST group and get it accepted within NATO in order to get an 
increased Canadian military presence in Europe.154 Even though the Americans 
welcomed this increased assistance in defending Northern Europe, particularly Norway, 
they did not want this to come at the expense of Canada’s permanent forces in West 
Germany. It was becoming clear to the Pentagon that the CF would be unable to support 
both European commitments with a declining relative defence budget and a shrinking 
regular force. However, this was not even discussed by Trudeau and his Cabinet in the 
years before and after the release of the 1971 White Paper. Trudeau, and many within his 
Cabinet were determined to reduce the forces assigned to CENTAG and central Europe, 
in order to reduce defence commitments and free more funds for social welfare programs.  
Having two commitments in different regions of Europe would have caused a lot 
of strain on the Canadian Forces and eventually force them to rely on their allies for 
assistance in transport and supply. However, while this would eventually lead to the 
degrading of Canada’s military sovereignty within NATO, it was not even considered by 
Trudeau and his defence officials.155 This was further complicated by the dismal shape of 
Maritime Command’s escort fleet and the fact that no Alliance warships were assigned to 
escort the CAST group to Norway in the event of war, according to NATO war plans.156 
To the Americans, it appeared that Trudeau was going to depend on the vast capabilities 
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of the USN and USAF to help transport the CAST group and reinforcements to the 
4CMBG in Germany in the event of war. However, it soon became clear to Trudeau that 
Washington and Canada’s European allies considered the 4CMBG presence in West 
Germany as extremely important to NATO.  He was faced with growing opposition from 
the US and European armed forces to ensure that Canada retained its military forces in 
Germany. 
The increasing cooperation between the Canadian and American armed forces as 
a result of Trudeau’s commitment to protecting the US nuclear arsenal was not limited to 
Maritime Command and North American units. Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) was 
being forced into increasingly bilateral cooperation with US forces they were working 
with. NATO had been an important element of Canadian defence policy since its 
creation, as it enabled Canada to be part of a large military alliance without having to 
enter into an unequal bilateral military alliance with the United States. The defence of 
Western Europe extended the American defence perimeter beyond North America and 
enabled Canadian governments to transform their defence relationship from an unequal 
partnership into a multi-tiered one based on mutual dependence.157 While the US 
government was attempting to overcome the fallout from the Vietnam conflict, the US 
military was in disarray, and many European defence officials feared a significant 
drawback of American forces in Europe.  
The release of the 1971 White Paper raised many fears from the members of 
NATO that Trudeau and Macdonald would work to withdraw all Canadian Forces units 
from Europe by the end of the decade. The main fear among NATO leaders was that if 
the 4CMBG was withdrawn from Europe, then it would soon be followed by significant 
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elements of the US forces in Europe. This stemmed from a belief within NATO, and 
certain elements of the US Armed Forces, that as the other North American nation that 
had forces in Europe that the 4CMBG and the Air Group provided a political significance 
to the US.158 It is this significance that many NATO officials believed helped to maintain 
the American military commitment to Europe.159 However, despite this large fear among 
members of the European NATO community, it was largely unwarranted as the US was 
committed to the forward defence of North America in Europe. The US Secretary of 
Defence, James Schlesinger, stated in 1974 to Trudeau that if both the US and Canada 
focused solely on North American defence then soon there would only be North America 
left to defend.160 Furthermore, this development of interoperability and cooperation did 
not only extend to the Canadian and American military forces in Europe but also to those 
forces within North America.  
With the movement of the 4CMBG from the British sector to the American 
Central Army Group in the summer of 1971, the Brigade had begun to work very closely 
with their American counterparts in CENTAG. Although the Brigade Group was not very 
large (it had been reduced to less than three thousand personnel since the release of the 
White Paper), it provided a key reserve force for the VIII (US) Corps as well as the II 
(German) Corps.161 As a result of this shift, Mobile Command began to work very closely 
with the US Army in early 1972 in order to develop a significant interoperability 
capability with the US.162  This was done so that the 4CMBG and its attached units from 
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Canada would be able to seamlessly work with the US Army in Europe in the event of 
war. Communications, tactics and supply were extremely important to the 4CMBG and 
resulted in it working tirelessly with their American counterparts to make this transition 
as easy as possible during any conflict.163  
For most of the remaining years of the 1970s, 4CMBG and the Air Command 
squadrons stationed in Europe worked tirelessly to develop this interoperability, as they 
needed to work closely with the much larger US forces in order to survive in the event of 
a major European conflict. Despite the request by the Canadian CDS, General Jacques 
Dextraze, in 1974 for a replacement for the ageing Centurion battle tank, Macdonald and 
Trudeau planned to purchase a light armoured vehicle to replace the tank.164 However, if 
4CMBG were to become a successful reconnaissance unit, it would need main battle 
tanks to defend itself from the heavily armoured formations of the Warsaw Pact stationed 
in East Germany. As a result of their increasingly ageing equipment, the Canadian Forces 
in Germany were rapidly integrating with their US allies because the Trudeau 
Government was not providing these units with the necessary equipment, funds and 
manpower to successfully fight a prolonged conflict with the Warsaw Pact. 
With the Canadian air and land forces in Europe now all working under the direct 
command of larger US formations and Trudeau’s defence focus on North America, it had 
become essential that Canadian Forces Europe begin to develop a strong working 
relationship with the American forces. In response to the increasingly shrinking 
manpower and ageing equipment, Mobile Command issued an ultimatum to the 
Government in early 1974. The leaders of Mobile Command stated that a useful 
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Canadian land force element could not continue in Europe beyond 1976 unless one of 
two important elements occurred: a) a new main battle tank was purchased to replace the 
Centurion, or b) the force was transformed to become highly specialized in anti-tank and 
air defence roles and designed to become integrated into larger American or West 
German formations.165 When Mobile Command received no response from the 
Government, it began to use NATO’s annual REFORGER exercises to develop joint 
Canadian-American standard operating procedures between 4CMBG and the VIII (US) 
Corps commander, General George Blanchard.166 These procedures were designed to 
help integrate 4CMBG and its reinforcements from Canada into either the V (US) Corps 
or VIII (US) Corps in the near future.  
 In 1976 4CMBG began to take on a more important role in the VIII (US) Corps 
and full-scale training between the Canadian and American forces began. In 1975 the US 
had withdrawn two brigades of the 1st Infantry Division from Europe, which resulted in 
General Blanchard developing plans to use 4CMBG as the second brigade for the 
division until the other two brigades were returned to Europe.167 As a result, between 
1976 and 1979 4CMBG was focused on ‘plugging-in’ to the US logistical system and 
developing common fire support procedures with the US Army in Europe.168 This was 
accompanied by a 1977 proposal by the US Armed Forces to integrate all Canadian 
military units in Europe into the American military logistics system. The proposed 
CA/US ILOC Agreement was agreed to by the Trudeau Government in 1979 and 
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effectively enabled CFE to use all American transport, supply and maintenance facilities, 
while also integrating all Canadian military needs into the vast US logistical system.169 
Furthermore, by 1979 the Minister of National Defence, Barney Danson, 
witnessed first-hand the interoperability between the Canadian and American forces in 
Europe. At a 1979 NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., the US delegation was 
attempting to reconfigure the amount of conventional forces within Europe and those 
immediately available for reinforcement from Canada, the UK and the US. Danson fully 
agreed with the US proposal, but he was surprised when throughout the report the US 
considered all Canadian European forces as part of its own European forces and took full 
responsibility in aiding the air and sea transport of Canadian reinforcements to CENTAG 
and Northern Europe.170 In addition, the US representatives stated that they would strive 
to develop national mobilization plans between Canada and the US to maximize 
transport, training and equipment available in North America and encouraged the 
European NATO members to do the same.171 While Danson, who was different from 
Trudeau’s previous Defence Ministers in that he was a strong supporter of the military, 
agreed that this was necessary both he and Trudeau were caught off guard. However, this 
NATO proposal showed how close the Canadian and American forces in Europe had 
become, as the Americans identified 4CMBG and the air component as homogenous 
units within the VII Corps. By having CFE integrate with the US logistics system and 
frontline military units, it enabled Trudeau and his Cabinet to focus on North America by 
not having to send additional Canadian military units to active service in Western Europe.  
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Much like their counterparts in Maritime Command, Trudeau’s Cabinet had 
pushed 4CMBG and CFE towards developing a close interaction with US forces through 
his constant manpower and budget cuts and his demands to focus on North American 
defence. This cooperation extended to the point that Canadian and American forces were 
rapidly developing capabilities, procedures and strategies to have Canadian military units 
become part of larger US forces, under American commanders, during times of crisis. 
While the forces in Europe were committed to developing increasingly integrated 
capabilities with the Americans, Trudeau had begun to redirect his defence efforts to the 
protection of the US nuclear deterrent. Unsurprisingly to the two main CDS in the 1970s, 
General Dextraze and Admiral Robert Falls, along with Danson, who became Trudeau’s 
longest serving Minister of Defence, Trudeau was constantly trying to find a way to focus 
Canadian defence efforts on North America and away from its international 
commitments. 
Defence of the American Nuclear Deterrent in North America 
Between 1970 and 1975 the Trudeau Government was almost entirely focused on 
the protection of Canadian sovereignty by the CF through the reshaping of Air and 
Maritime Commands to protect Canadian territory. Along with this, manpower available 
to Mobile Command was reduced and new equipment for its forces in Europe and 
designated for Europe was not purchased. Furthermore, 4CMBG manpower was reduced 
by fifty percent, with many of these personnel being taken off of the defence payroll. 
However, when it became clear that he would not be able to remove the Brigade from 
Europe and that the only way to protect Canadian sovereignty was to work closely with 
the US military, Trudeau once again switched his military objectives. While Trudeau had 
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stated his desire for the Canadian Forces to defend Canada without any significant 
American military presence since his election victory in 1968, the reality was that Canada 
could not defend its vast land, air and waterways without US assistance. Historian John 
Gellner stated the fact that fully one half of the Canadian defence effort “was made 
necessary by our geographical position as the strategic fore field of the United States.”172 
Canada could either assist the US in the security of its nuclear forces or let the US 
military do it in Canadian airspace, waterways and on Canadian territory.173 The result 
was that with the beginning of a thawing relationship between the two superpowers and 
an end to détente, Trudeau could either assist the US or let the US defend Canada, which 
would have had grave impacts on Trudeau’s sovereignty protection goals. 
Despite his desire to limit the number of American forces involved in the defence 
of Canada, Trudeau and his Cabinet declared to NDHQ and the military in a National 
Defence document, entitled Defence 1976, that their main goal was in assisting the 
Americans in the protection of their nuclear deterrent.174 Once again the military’s goals 
were switched around and they – particularly Air and Maritime Command – were 
encouraged by the Government to work much more closely with their US counterparts to 
better protect North America. One of Trudeau’s Ministers of National Defence, James 
Richardson, illustrated the importance that the Trudeau Government placed on Air 
Command in a 1974 speech. Richardson stated that other than sovereignty, Canada’s 
most important goal was the defence of North America and “if it were not for Air 
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Defence Command…we would have to call on the Americans for assistance.”175 While 
Mobile Command was primarily focused on its efforts in helping to defend Europe, with 
American forces, Air and Maritime Command now found themselves working with US 
forces throughout North America. 
In 1975 CDS General Jacques Dextraze approached Trudeau in order to have a 
new tank purchased for the CF to replace the ageing Centurion. Instead of a new tank, the 
Government purchased 491 armoured reconnaissance vehicles for the military.176 
Dextraze, however, was determined to get a new tank for Mobile Command and 
eventually succeeded when he approached West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 
who offered Trudeau economic tradeoffs in return for Canada’s purchase of the German-
built Leopard tank.177 After Barney Danson became the new Minister of Defence in 1977, 
he proceeded to work tirelessly to provide the military with what it needed. Danson 
immediately sought to revamp the reserve forces of the CF as well as to try and convince 
Trudeau of the urgent need to purchase a new interceptor aircraft for Air Command and 
the urgent need of new frigates for Maritime Command.178 With a constantly shrinking 
relative defence budget and trained personnel, the CF was being forced by Trudeau to 
cooperate closely with the US in order to carry out their primary objectives. 
Since the 1971 Defence White Paper, the Trudeau Government had placed an 
increasing priority on North American defence. Consequently, Canadian and American 
military officers and government defence officials had begun to work very closely 
together. The decision by Trudeau to focus the CF efforts on North American defence 
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allowed these ties to develop even further. With their new orders focusing them on North 
America, Air and Maritime Commands had developed a close working relationship with 
the USAF and USN. Since the end of the Second World War, Canada had signed over 
one hundred defence agreements or memorandums of understanding with the United 
States.179 Two of the most important agreements were directly related to both Canadian 
sovereignty and the defence of the US nuclear forces, which Minister of Defence Danson 
declared were the CF’s more important objectives in 1978.180 The first agreement was the 
Air Defence of the North American Continent (ADNAC), which was designed to create a 
defence-in-depth using all available Canadian and American air defence units. The 
second was the Commander, Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces, Atlantic 
(COMASWFORLANT)- Canadian Commander, Maritime Atlantic 
(CANCOMARLANT), which was to coordinate the use of North American air, surface 
and submarine forces in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans.181 Although both of these 
agreements had been signed soon after the creation of the Basic Security Plan in the 
1950s, the Government and NDHQ gave them a higher priority as a result of Trudeau’s 
desire to focus Canadian defence efforts on North America. 
 Prime Minister Trudeau and members of his Cabinet constantly reiterated that the 
two primary goals of the CF during the 1970s were the protection of Canadian 
sovereignty and the defence of North America. However, while he believed that these 
two goals were extremely important he refused to provide the CF with the necessary 
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equipment, manpower, and funds to properly carry out these roles. In order to 
successfully accomplish these two goals, Canadian military officials were forced to work 
almost exclusively with the US. The cutbacks initiated by the Trudeau Government, 
along with the force reductions in Europe, had forced the CF to work much more closely 
with the US security umbrella, both conventional and nuclear forces, in order to preserve 
any semblance of Canadian continental defence.182  
Since 1974 the US had chosen to focus on the forward defence of North America 
by helping to defend Western Europe.183 However, the Pentagon had identified a growing 
threat to their nuclear forces – the presence of nuclear equipped Soviet submarines off of 
the Canadian and American coasts. Upon taking office in 1974 US President Gerald Ford 
began to pressure Trudeau to move Maritime Command towards closer participation with 
the USN to combat this emerging threat. In order to ensure the US that he was intent on 
helping to protect the nuclear deterrent, Trudeau made a drastic shift in Canadian 
maritime defence policy in early 1975. With Trudeau’s shift to North American defence 
and sovereignty protection in the early 1970’s, Maritime Command began to greatly 
suffer from his cutbacks. Since Ottawa created a permanent naval force in 1910, it had 
always worked in larger RN and USN task forces and battle groups. The Canadian naval 
element had always focused on providing their larger allies with escort vessels that 
excelled in ASW, minesweeping and convoy protection duties. However, by the time 
Trudeau dedicated the Atlantic fleet to the defence of the US nuclear deterrent in 1975, it 
was unable to provide any real contribution to larger USN task forces and carrier battle 
groups. By 1975 MARCOM’s vessels and equipment had become so outdated and 
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obsolete that it became dependent on USN minesweeping and air defence assets for 
assistance in almost all of its operations.184 
The dire strait of Maritime Command was confirmed by a meeting that Atlantic 
Fleet commander Admiral Douglas Boyle had with Conservative MPs in Halifax in the 
spring of 1975. At a meeting at CFB Halifax, Boyle stated that there was an increase in 
Soviet naval activity off of the East Coast but that he was unable to send his ships out to 
counter this threat because of a lack of fuel.185 This was followed by a 1977 public 
statement by popular author Brian Cuthbertson in which he stated that Canada was being 
forced to rely on the USN for the protection of its waterways.186 His view became 
important as the Canadian public now began to pressure the Trudeau Cabinet to provide 
the CF with the budget, equipment and manpower necessary to accomplish their 
objectives. Cuthbertson further argued that the degree of independence that Maritime 
Command could have in North America would be directly related to its capabilities; 
fewer capabilities meant that Canada would become more dependent on US naval power 
for assistance.187 With a constant budget that did not allow for major equipment 
purchases or upgrades, it was clear that Maritime Command was losing its ability to work 
with larger American naval groups. As the Trudeau Government was not willing to 
increase the share of the federal budget dedicated to defence, it was resulting in 
MARCOM losing its critical ASW, air-defence and minesweeping capabilities that 
enabled it to provide a significant contribution to USN forces. The end result was that 
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without a significant Canadian naval contribution, the defence of North America’s 
waterways would be solely up to the USN. Trudeau had placed an emphasis on the 
defence of Canada and the US nuclear deterrent but was not prepared to provide 
MARCOM with the equipment, budget and manpower to even remotely achieve these 
objectives.  
Since the signing of the NATO agreement in 1949, the vast majority of Canada’s 
East Coast Fleet had been dedicated to NATO’s SACLANT, which was headquartered in 
Norfolk, Virginia, and led by a USN admiral.188 Despite the importance of this task, 
Trudeau’s Cabinet ordered Maritime Command to restrict its ASW operations to the 
protection of the US nuclear forces.189 The result was that by 1976 the Trudeau 
Government had focused almost all Canadian naval efforts on defending the coasts of 
North America from Soviet submarines, without having these forces stationed across the 
Atlantic. However, this decision also forced Maritime Command to adapt to US naval 
strategies and forced them to prepare to operate seamlessly with American naval battle 
groups. In Defence 1977, the Government stated the main goal of Maritime Command 
was to conduct surveillance against Soviet ballistic missile submarines, which help 
prevent a large surprise attack on North American urban centres and military 
installations.190 Furthermore, the report stated that “Canadian naval vessels, in 
conjunction with the USN, detect and monitor hostile maritime operations in waters off 
the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.”191 Even though the Government had placed a significant 
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emphasis on the defence of North America, Maritime Command was in dire need of new 
equipment and a new class of escort vessels to replace the rapidly outdated and ageing 
frigates and destroyers that made up the current fleet. By the end of the decade 
MARCOM was in no position to fulfill all of Trudeau’s requests without the assistance of 
the USN. 
Much of the latter half of the decade was spent on exercises involving American 
and Canadian naval vessels working together in the defence of both NATO and North 
America. Canadian-American Exercises (CANUSEX) were held regularly and sought to 
integrate ships, aircraft and submarines of the USN and Maritime Command in all facets 
of naval warfare.192 Meanwhile, the Second Destroyer Squadron, operating off of 
Canada’s Pacific Coast, was dedicated to support the USN’s Pacific Fleet in the event of 
a major conflict.193 Through these exercises Canadian warships were being effectively 
integrated into larger USN task forces. In a situation similar to the RCN’s efforts with the 
RN in the Second World War, Canadian naval policy throughout the Cold War was based 
on the likely challenges to American naval power and creating defences against these 
challenges.194 By having it work closely with the USN, Trudeau had intended for 
Maritime Command to show that it could make a significant contribution to the defence 
of North America’s waterways. The end result, however, showed that the constant budget 
and manpower cuts were forcing Maritime Command to operate closely with the USN, as 
they did not have the power to protect Canadian waterways by themselves. 
Trudeau and his Cabinet were soon faced with the same problem that had 
impacted Pearson and Hellyer’s reforms in the 1960s. When the Canadian Armed Forces 
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became too cooperative with their American counterparts, the general public and 
politicians began to demand that the federal government divorce itself from the powerful 
US military system. In a House of Commons session in 1975 many MPs began to 
question the growing cooperation between the Canadian and American armed forces in 
the protection of Canadian sovereign airspace and waterways. Many of the elected 
representatives believed that in his haste to redirect the CF towards North American 
defence and away from European defence, Trudeau had instead moved the CF very close 
to the US Armed Forces. It was argued within Parliament that the Trudeau government 
had focused its air defence on the east and west coasts but left the control of airspace over 
much of Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan to American air defence headquarters and 
USAF aircraft.195 It was becoming clear that in his attempt to guarantee Canadian 
sovereignty the Prime Minister was instead pushing the CF into a closer working 
relationship with the US, who he deemed as the main defenders of the Western world. 
Canada had become an important aspect of US strategic defence plans regarding 
North American defence. The Pentagon viewed Canada as an important aspect of 
continental defence as it provided the US Armed Forces with a defence-in-depth 
capability to help defend their nuclear forces in the American Midwest.196 Trudeau also 
believed that Canada had an important role to play in the defence of the US nuclear 
deterrent. However, with his mind focused on the creation and expansion of social 
services within Canada, he would not be able to increase the percentage of the federal 
budget that was reserved for the Ministry of National Defence. By 1975 it had become 
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clear to Trudeau and his Cabinet that in order for Canada to remain relevant in the 
defence of the continent they would either have to adhere to certain American strategic 
military initiatives or allow the United States to become the sole defender of North 
America.197 Defence Minister Danson argued in 1978 that Canada needed to work closely 
with the US, as a rejuvenated CF would help the US deter any aggression by the Soviet 
Union.198 Furthermore, he argued to convince Trudeau and members of his Cabinet that 
the conventional military forces of North America were there to deter a war not to start 
one.199 The second option was not viable to Trudeau, as it would lead to the US having to 
defend Canada and the violation of Canadian sovereignty, so he chose to move the CF 
closer towards the Americans by accepting a number of US defence initiatives. 
As Trudeau’s main defence policies had gravitated towards North America, the 
major tool for his defence efforts became Air Command. Mobile Command and Maritime 
Command had been dedicated to the defence of Europe and NATO sea-lanes with their 
American allies, both of which Trudeau was finding hard to withdraw from. However, 
with Air Command he had found a force that he would be able to focus almost solely on 
Canadian defence. Through NORAD and the Air Interceptor Warning Plan, Air 
Command was primarily focused on its closely integrated capabilities to defend North 
American airspace with the USAF. Air Command’s contribution to NORAD by 1977 
took up a large majority of its active air defence forces. By 1977 Canada’s contribution to 
NORAD was four squadrons of CF-101 aircraft, twenty-four surveillance radars, two 
satellite tracking installations and 10,500 military personnel, the majority of whom were 
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provided by Air Command.200 All of this equipment and personnel had become part of a 
well-integrated North American air defence force, which was predominantly focused on 
providing the USAF and SAC with an in-depth defence and early warning capability 
rather than the protection of Canada’s sovereign airspace.201 Despite the importance that 
Trudeau had placed on the defence of both sovereignty and the US nuclear deterrent by 
Air Command, he was also not prepared to provide them with the necessary equipment. 
In late 1977 the American military began to refocus its efforts on conventional 
forces as a result of ongoing nuclear limitation talks between President Jimmy Carter and 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.202 In 1978 President Carter created mobile task forces 
that could be sent anywhere in the world without drawing on the US military resources 
dedicated to NATO defence. Carter earmarked three Army divisions and one Marine 
division for these tasks.203  In addition, a new main battle tank was purchased for the 
Army, while the F-15, F-16, and F-18 fighters were introduced in large quantities into the 
USAF and the USN.204 However, most of these new aircraft were dedicated to the 
forward defence of NATO in Western Europe and not to NORAD.  
While the US was busy trying to build up its conventional forces, Trudeau was 
trying to focus the efforts of the CF on North America. With the US beginning to place a 
much larger emphasis on conventional forces, President Carter began to ask Trudeau to 
focus the CF primary efforts on the defence of Western Europe and make North 
American defence a secondary objective. In October 1978, Minister of Defence Danson 
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indicated in a speech that Canadian and American military officers had begun to 
undertake informal discussions to determine how best to make use of the small CF in the 
defence of the continent.205 As a result of these formal and informal discussions between 
members of both countries militaries and governments, a remarkable similarity in 
strategic views between the two armed forces began to develop during the second half of 
the decade. Through these meetings Canadian military officials began to look at Canada’s 
strategic military questions through the eyes of the American military,206 which was 
beginning to directly affect the CF’s strategic thinking and planning. While these 
discussions were very important to the continued development of Canadian-American 
military relations, they were a direct result of the lack of importance that Prime Minister 
Trudeau and his Cabinet were placing on the Canadian Forces. 
A number of publications by the Department of National Defence and NDHQ 
during 1977 and 1978 indicated just how valuable the American nuclear deterrent, and, 
by extension, cooperation with the US military was to the federal government. Defence 
1977, the annual publication on the state of the CF, illustrated the increased importance 
the Trudeau Government was putting on cooperating with the US. The document stated 
“Canada’s overriding defence objective, therefore, remains that of contributing to the 
prevention of nuclear war. Attainment of this objective continues to rest on the 
maintenance by the United States of credible strategic retaliatory capabilities.”207 The 
document went on to suggest that this deterrent was only protected by the cooperation of 
Canadian and American forces in providing air and naval defenses for US military 
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installations.208 However, Washington was focusing on building up its conventional 
military forces in Europe, and ranked the defence of North America as a small priority.  
The Prime Minister’s desire to solely defend North America was reinforced in 
Defence 1978. This document argued that, while a Soviet attack on North America was 
unlikely, the only way an attack would not occur was to ensure that both Canada and the 
US maintain sufficient forces on the continent to deter any aggression.209 Despite the 
Americans moving towards Europe, Trudeau had made it abundantly clear that he wanted 
to move the CF away from their European commitments to focus on the defence of 
Canada and the US. However, the sheer number of defence agreements and the 
cooperation between the two armed forces meant that the Americans would have a 
significant voice in the creation of significant Canadian defence policies and objectives.  
The air forces of the US and NATO had been re-equipped with modern 
interceptors and fighters while AIRCOM was stuck with the CF-101 Voodoo and CF-104 
Starfighter interceptors to defend North America and Europe. Both types of these aircraft 
had been retired by almost every other NATO nation as they could no longer provide 
adequate front-line air defence capabilities and were rapidly outclassed by modern Soviet 
interceptor aircraft.210 However, despite the cries from the Air Force of the need to 
replace these two aircraft that had been developed in the 1950s, Trudeau did not begin to 
seriously discuss their replacement until 1978. By delaying the purchase of a new, state 
of the art interceptor aircraft, Ottawa was slowly moving itself to more dependence on 
American air defence units. The USAF was in the process of introducing a number of 
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new fighter and interceptor aircraft, as well as airborne early warning aircraft (AWACS), 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and advanced ground radars based in the 
continental US. 
Conclusion 
By the end of the 1970s, it was becoming clear that Trudeau’s desire to redirect 
the CF towards North America was designed to simply allow the Prime Minister to 
reduce the share that defence received from the federal government budget and redirect 
these expenditures towards social welfare projects. Upon the release of the 1971 White 
Paper, Trudeau had focused his abilities on the defence of Canadian sovereignty and the 
participation with the US in the defence of the nuclear deterrent. In a situation that had 
plagued his predecessor’s in the Unification decade of the 1960s, Trudeau only managed 
to push the CF into further cooperation with the American military. In an attempt to make 
the CF an equal partner in North American defence, the federal Government had instead 
further reduced the capabilities of the Armed Forces. The reductions were so severe that 
Canadian military units in both Europe and in Canada had to develop close contact with 
their American counterparts for assistance in supply and certain combat support in the 
event of war with the Warsaw Pact. 
One of the most important defence objectives of the 1970s had been the 
protection of Canadian sovereignty. NDHQ had been tasked with redirecting forces 
committed to Europe back to Canadian defence. However, with the large number of 
defence agreements signed between Ottawa and Washington, it soon became clear that 
the US would have to be closely consulted on almost all aspects of Canadian sovereignty 
protection. Air, Maritime and Mobile Commands all found themselves having to 
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cooperate very closely with the US armed forces, and American aircraft and naval vessels 
continuously patrolled Canadian airspace and sea approaches in the Arctic as well as 
patrolling airspace in the Maritimes and Ontario. In addition, Canadian Forces in Europe 
were continuously neglected and were reduced to a very small brigade group and air 
group within larger American air and ground forces. In order to accomplish their goal of 
assisting in the defence of Western Europe, CFE was forced to develop an unheard of 
interoperability with American Army corps it was tasked with reinforcing in the Central 
Army Group. Despite its small size, this air and ground commitment was shown as being 
extremely important in upholding NATO solidarity. 
Even though the Trudeau Government was focused on limiting the number of 
American forces involved in the defence of Canadian territory, it also realized that the 
alliance with the United States was the most important aspect of Canada’s national 
security. As Mobile Command was committed to maintaining its meager forces in 
Europe, the MoND looked towards Air and Maritime Command to become the main 
Canadian elements assisting in the defence of the American nuclear forces. Air 
Command was looked at, initially, as the most important branch of the CF in North 
American defence. Through NORAD and the Basic Security Plan, Air Command had 
effectively been dedicated to the defence of North American airspace since the early 
1950s. Although its leaders took this objective seriously, the federal Government 
seemingly began to abandon it through the constant cutbacks in personnel and equipment.  
Air Command had developed a strong relationship with the USAF and began to look 
towards them for assistance in many of its North American objectives. A similar situation 
existed within Maritime Command for much of the decade.  
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As the protector of Canada’s coasts Maritime Command had also been identified 
as an important element in the defence of North America. By 1975 the lack of desire by 
Trudeau and his Cabinet to increase the share of the federal budget dedicated to defence 
resulted in MARCOM unable to purchase much-needed modern warships and valuable 
equipment. This left Canada’s admirals and senior naval officers with an increasing need 
for American assistance in the defence of Canadian waters. Maritime Command did not 
receive any increase in equipment, personnel or government funds. By 1979 the situation 
with Maritime Command had deteriorated to a point where the USN believed that it 
would have to protect the entire North American coastline, not just the US. In a similar 
reaction to the increasing cooperation between the Canadian and American militaries 
during the Unification decade, Trudeau was faced with a public outcry to reequip all 
three major branches of the CF in order to negate the increasing role that the US Armed 
Forces were being forced to take on in many of Canada’s defence objectives.  
By the end of the decade it was becoming clear to many in the Canadian and 
American governments and armed forces that the détente strategy that had dominated the 
1970s would soon give way to a massive build-up of conventional forces. The US was 
not willing to do this alone and its close relationship with Canada meant that the CF 
would have to be re-equipped and built up during the 1980s. While the defence of North 
America had dominated Canadian defence policies during the 1970s, it was clear that the 
forward defence of Western Europe by conventional Canadian, American and NATO 
forces was going to dominate the CF in the next decade. With the election of a more 
hardline American president in 1980 and a stronger stance by NATO on the large Soviet 
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buildup in Europe, it was clear that Canada was going to have to rapidly shift its focus 
from North America and back to Europe in the 1980s. 
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Chapter Three 
The Re-Equipping of the Canadian Forces, 1979-1989 
 
 In late 1978 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau began to feel pressure from Canada’s 
European NATO allies and, more importantly, the United States regarding the dismal 
state of the Canadian Forces. Over the previous two decades the CF had been reduced in 
size and, despite the constantly changing objectives handed to them by the federal 
governments of Pearson and Trudeau, had not received any substantial new equipment 
since Unification in 1967. However, with the end of détente and a new hardline attitude 
by the US regarding the Soviet Union, it was becoming clear that the CF would have to 
be given increased manpower and new equipment to appease its US and NATO allies. 
For much of the Cold War, the main objective of the Department of National Defence in 
its relations with its southern neighbour was to ensure that Canada did not become a 
strategic liability to the US.211 With this scenario now looming, the successive 
governments of Trudeau and Brian Mulroney attempted to undertake a significant rebuild 
of the CF throughout the 1980s. 
 As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union increased during the 
1980s, so did the pressure the Canadian government felt from Washington in regards to 
the CF. Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when Canadian politicians had pushed the Canadian 
military towards closer cooperation with the US, the 1980s signaled a shift in the military 
relationship between the two North American allies. With a rapidly heating Cold War, 
the US government and military took an active interest in the shape and size of the 
Canadian Forces and directly pressured Ottawa to provide the CF with new equipment 
for all branches of the military. From the American perspective, a substantially stronger 
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CF would not only help protect US strategic military interests, but it could also free up 
conventional US military assets for other commitments. As the CF was slowly rebuilt, 
Prime Ministers Trudeau and Mulroney worked closely with the US government in order 
to reshape NATO strategy and continental defence arrangements in order to meet the 
growing Soviet conventional threat, as perceived by Washington. Direct cooperation 
between the two governments also resulted in an increased cooperation between the CF 
and the American military. 
 With the end of détente and a growing arsenal of conventional forces in both 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Air Command began to work almost exclusively with the 
USAF and the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Both air forces worked tirelessly to 
integrate their fighter forces, as much as possible, so they could work seamlessly to 
defend North America in the event of a major conflict. In addition, Ottawa was heavily 
pressured by Washington to allow USAF interceptors, tanker aircraft, Airborne Warning 
aircraft (AWACS), and SAC B-52 strategic bombers to develop contingency bases 
throughout Canada. As a result, the equipment and personnel of Air Command were also 
ordered to work closely with these USAF units to develop strategies and plans for 
seamless deployment if these aircraft were forced to use Canada as an operating location. 
Finally, the 1986 renewal of the NORAD Agreement was heavily influenced by the fears 
of Washington directly violating Canadian sovereignty if Ottawa did not agree to the 
renewal of NORAD. 
 The close cooperation between the two militaries was not limited to the air forces 
but also spread to the land forces of North America. Mobile Command was almost 
entirely focused on defending Western Europe with their American partner. Strategists 
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and US Army commanders began pushing new land battle doctrines and strategies on 
their Canadian allies. These doctrines and strategies were readily accepted by Mobile 
Command to ensure that it maintained its capacity to operate with larger American 
divisions, corps and army groups in Europe. Furthermore, many members of the USMC 
and Army who worked closely with Mobile Command began to pressure Ottawa to 
restructure its land combat elements into units that would closely resemble US light 
mechanized divisions. While Canadian politicians eventually turned down this proposal, 
it did show the increasing cooperation between the US Army and Mobile Command in 
Europe and North America.  
 Finally, Maritime Command began to take on an increased role in USN war 
strategies and began to accept USN doctrine as the basis for its own strategies and naval 
doctrine. Beginning in the early 1980s, the USN wanted Maritime Command to focus 
solely on ASW operations with a fleet of destroyers and frigates for this specific purpose. 
The proposal by the Mulroney Government to purchase nuclear attack submarines (SSN) 
for Maritime Command was met with criticism from the USN, which eventually led to 
the scrapping of the whole SSN proposal. It was clear that the 1980s was to signal an 
increased cooperation between all aspects of the CF and their American counterparts. 
The Buildup of the US Military under the Reagan Administration 
After witnessing the violent takeovers of Nicaragua and Iran by anti-US forces as 
well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Reagan administration –
inaugurated in January 1981 – argued that the Soviet threat was greater than ever and 
needed to be countered by US military power. As a result Reagan adopted four initiatives 
related to the US conventional military forces: a) an increase in the USN’s fleet from 450 
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to 600 combat vessels; b) a plan to pressure Soviet interests around the world to gain 
military leverage for the US; c) accelerate procurement and development of ‘smart’ 
weapons; and d) increase the level of training and combat preparedness for the US 
regular forces.212 These four initiatives were to increase the combat power available to 
the US military as well as ease any concerns of Washington’s European allies regarding 
the state of the US military. Whereas President Carter had reduced US defence spending 
and redirected these funds to social welfare programs, Reagan immediately began to 
increase the defence spending and compelled the Soviet Union to do the same in 
response. The following chart illustrates the increasing US defence budgets between 1980 
and 1989. 
           US Defence Budget, 1980-
1989213 
 Year Budget (in billions of USD) Percentage of GNP  
1980 134 4.90% 
1981 157.5 5.20% 
1982 185.3 5.80% 
1983 209.9 6.10% 
1984 227.4 6.00% 
1985 252.7 6.20% 
1986 273.4 6.20% 
1987 282 6.10% 
1988 290.4 5.80% 
1989 303.6 5.60% 
 
The chart clearly shows that Reagan and his Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, 
increased the defence budget by almost eighty-six billion dollars in his first term as 
President. Reagan was using his first term in the Oval Office to significantly buildup the 
US military in order to bring the Soviet Union to the bargaining table in the near 
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future.214 The new influx of dollars into the military allowed the US Army, Navy and Air 
Force to undertake a number of plans to reorganize and buildup the strength available to 
them. 
The US Army in 1980 was in dire need of a massive reorganization and 
modernization scheme that would enable it to combat both the heavily armoured Soviet 
threat in Europe but also rapidly deploy light forces for any military contingency 
throughout the world. While Weinberger provided the Army with new funds, he tasked 
the two main Army commanders under Reagan, Generals Edward C. Meyer and John A. 
Wickman Jr., with undertaking these modernization and reorganization schemes while 
holding the US Army strength at 781,000 personnel.215 By the end of 1987 the US Army 
had undertaken a number of modernization projects. The M1A1 Abrams had been 
introduced as the new main battle tank as well as a new infantry fighting vehicle (M3 
Bradley), a new attack helicopter (the AH-64 Apache), artillery, air defence equipment 
and smart weapons for all branches of the Army.216 Along with the new equipment, the 
Army was reorganized into twenty-eight divisions composed of both regular and reserve 
personnel and designed for combat in both Europe and anywhere else in the world.217  
 While the Army had undergone a rapid reorganization and modernization project, 
the USN was tasked with a rapid expansion of its combat projection capabilities during 
the 1980s. The Navy was given the highest priority by both Reagan and Weinberger. 
Before a meeting of Congress in February 1982, Weinberger stated that the goal of the 
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new administration was “maritime superiority over any likely enemy.”218 To accomplish 
this goal the USN was to undergo a rapid expansion of its combat projection capabilities 
in the number of warships it could put to sea. US Admiral Thomas Hayward argued in 
1982 that the US needed a navy with fifteen carrier battle groups, a large sea-lift 
capability and one hundred state of the art attack submarines.219 With the new levels of 
funding being poured into the Navy, it began to rapidly expand to meet President 
Reagan’s ambitious 600 ship navy plan. In 1980 the USN consisted of 497 combat 
capable vessels; by 1987 this had grown to 567 warships of all sizes.220 The USN 
benefited greatly under the Reagan administration as it saw the introduction of new 
warships of all sizes, from large aircraft carriers to smaller frigates and auxiliary vessels.  
While the Navy was tasked with a rapid expansion of its forces, the USAF was 
given more funds in order to produce an effective anti-ballistic missile and air defence 
system in the US and in near-earth orbit. The USAF was tasked with undertaking one of 
Reagan’s most ambitious military projects in the 1980s, the development of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). Weinberger created this initiative in order to provide the USAF 
with the equipment and ability to undertake an offensive defence of US and Allied 
territory during any potential conflict with the Soviet Union.221 An active air defence by 
the USAF, according to Weinberger, would keep the Soviet forces off balance and allow 
the USAF and allied air forces to successfully absorb any Soviet nuclear attack.222 Under 
the auspices of the SDI the Reagan administration sought to increase the number of 
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aircraft available to the USAF. New versions of the F-15 and F-16 multirole fighters were 
introduced in large numbers along with the new B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, AC-130 
Spectre gunship and numerous types of new multi-use helicopters.223 These new aircraft, 
when combined with the substantial USAF aircraft inventory in 1980, were to equip the 
US with the ability to provide a defence of American airspace and that of its allies in the 
face of any potential Soviet threats or aggression.  
Overall, the US military benefited strongly from the increased budgets that 
Reagan provided for defence in the 1980s. The military had grown from 2.95 million 
personnel in 1980 to 3.3 million in 1985.224 The rapid growth in both personnel and 
budgets also allowed Reagan to begin to demand that Canada and its other NATO allies 
build up their conventional military strength and increase their defence budgets. Reagan 
made it clear that détente was over and it was now time for NATO to flex its military and 
economic muscles to counter the perceived Soviet threat. 
Canadian defence spending during the 1980s increased dramatically over the 
decade. While the defence percentage of Canadian GNP fluctuated between 1.7% and 
1.8% more money was injected into the Ministry of National Defence to complete a 
number of important procurement projects. Canadian defence spending did not increase 
rapidly like that of the US; however, it did represent a significant shift in the respective 
policies of both the Trudeau and Mulroney governments as both Cabinets made the 
Canadian Forces an important aspect of their platforms. Although the Canadian national 
defence budget did not increase as much as President Reagan and his administration 
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would have liked, the influx of new money allowed for a number of new weapons and 
equipment to be introduced into the armed forces that enabled the CF to undertake a 
larger role in both NATO and NORAD. The following chart illustrates the National 
Defence budget of Canada between 1980 and 1989. 
National Defence Expenditures, Fiscal Years 
1980-1989 225 
Year Total Dollars (in millions) 
% of 
GDP 
1980 $5,298  1.70% 
1981 $5,975  1.70% 
1982 $6,903  1.80% 
1983 $7,209  1.80% 
1984 $7,900  1.80% 
1985 $8,386  1.70% 
1986 $9,143  1.80% 
1987 $9,708  1.70% 
1988 $10,206  1.70% 
1989 $10,982  1.70% 
 
The influx of more funds into National Defence enabled a number of important 
procurement projects to be completed. These programs were to have an important role as 
they provided the CF with modern state-of-the art equipment that would enable the CF to 
work with the US in North American and European defence as an important ally. The 
New Fighter Aircraft program, which had started in 1977, was finally finished in April 
1980 with the F-18 Hornet multirole fighter being selected as the winner, and 138 of 
these new fighters were delivered by 1988. This was followed by the introduction of the 
CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft to replace the ageing Argus in airborne ASW 
operations. Finally, the larger defence funds allowed Maritime Command (MARCOM) to 
order a new class of frigates specially designed for ASW and air-defence operations. All 
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three of these procurements showed Washington that Canada was indeed taking its 
defence seriously and also enabled the CF to take on a larger role in joint US-Canadian 
operations throughout the remainder of the Cold War. 
Air Command’s Cooperation with the USAF and SAC 
 Throughout the 1970s, Air Command had become the primary instrument of the 
Trudeau government to help protect Canadian sovereignty. As a result, it was almost 
always the first in line to get new equipment. However, in order to defend Canada, Air 
Command had to work very closely with the USAF. This cooperation led to the 
development of American and Canadian air units that worked almost exclusively with 
each other in preparation for a major conflict with the Soviet Union. By 1980 NORAD 
had came to be seen by many in Canada as a way of contributing to continental defence 
and also ensuring that the American government and USAF recognized Canada’s 
sovereignty.226 The increasing tension and the desire for larger conventional forces in 
NATO led the USAF to directly pressure Air Command to adopt US strategies and 
doctrines concerning the air defence of North America and Western Europe. 
 While Trudeau had wanted Air Command to focus on the defence of Canadian 
airspace, he had failed to upgrade the aircraft available to them. By 1977 the three main 
aircraft in Air Command’s inventory, the CF-104 Starfighter, CF-101 Voodoo, and CF-
116 Freedom Fighter had all been introduced between 1961 and 1968 and were severely 
outmatched by Allied and Soviet aircraft. Due to pressures from US President Jimmy 
Carter, Trudeau instructed Minister of Defence Barney Danson in the summer of 1977 to 
replace all three aircraft with a new multi-role fighter that could provide interceptor 
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capabilities in NORAD as well as provide air defence and ground-support capabilities in 
NATO.227 There were five aircraft selected to take part in the competition: the Grumman 
F-14 Tomcat, McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle, Panavia Tornado, General Dynamics F-16 
Fighting Falcon and the McDonnell-Douglas F-18 Hornet.228 By early 1980, the F-14 and 
the Tornado had both been rejected because of the cost of purchasing 120 to 150 of these 
aircraft. The F-15, F-16 and F-18 were to provide the principle debate among Air 
Command and the Government about which aircraft was right for Canada. 
 Near the end of 1979, the short-lived Progressive Conservative (PC) government 
under Prime Minister Joe Clark did not have a clear idea of which aircraft would be ideal 
for Canadian and NATO air defence. The PC Minister of National Defence, Allan 
McKinnon, argued with the Commander of Air Command, Lieutenant-General G.A. 
MacKenzie, about which aircraft to purchase. General MacKenzie stated that Air 
Command believed that Ottawa should purchase two different aircraft, one for NATO 
objectives and one for NORAD missions. For NORAD, AIRCOM wanted the F-15 Eagle 
interceptor and for NATO they wanted the F-16 Fighting Falcon, which could provide 
both interceptor and ground-support capabilities.229 However, the Trudeau Government 
made it clear prior to its fall in 1979 that it wanted one aircraft that could do both jobs 
and not two separate aircraft. On 3 March 1980 the PC Government fell and was replaced 
by a Liberal government once again led by Trudeau. Upon taking office, Trudeau made 
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Gilles Lamontaigne his new Defence Minister. His first goal was to reduce the number of 
aircraft in the competition and make it clear to AIRCOM that it would receive one class 
of aircraft to replace the ageing aircraft it currently possessed. The cost of the F-15, 
however, soon made Lamontaigne drop it from the competition, leaving only the de-
navalized version of the F-18 and the F-16. 
Both the F-18 and the F-16 went into the final competition in 1980. Once again 
the Government debated against Air Command about which aircraft to purchase. Minister 
of Defence Lamontaigne argued that as the F-16 was cheaper, more of these aircraft 
could be purchased under the $2.4 billion budget for the project, therefore providing Air 
Command with more than the 150 aircraft originally projected to be purchased.230 While 
Air Command did indeed like the F-16 as a ground-support aircraft suitable for action in 
Western Europe, they did not believe that it was suitable to patrol the vast Canadian 
airspace in NORAD.231 When the F-15 had been rejected, the Government had made it 
clear that they would only purchase one type of multi-role fighter to replace the three 
types currently serving in NORAD and NATO. As a result, AIRCOM worked diligently 
to have Ottawa announce the F-18 as the winner of the New Fighter Aircraft Project 
(NFAP).  
 AIRCOM pilots and commanders told Lamontaigne that the F-18 was ideal as it 
was equipped to carry long-range air-to-air missiles and had two engines, which was 
extremely important for any aircrew responsible for patrolling the vast Canadian 
                                                
230 Canada, SCEAND: Order of Reference Respecting: Main Estimates 1979-80 under National Defence, 
Issue no. 6 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, March 15, 1979) in evidence from Andrew Brewin, 13. 
231 Ibid., Appendix A6. 
 102 
airspaces.232 Both of these important factors were not available on the F-16, as it had only 
one engine and by 1980 did not have the capability to carry long or medium range air-to-
air missiles. As a result of both of these critical factors, Minister Lamontaigne along with 
Prime Minister Trudeau announced on 10 April 1980 that the F/A-18 Hornet had won the 
NFAP competition and would be purchased. Lamontaigne stated that this aircraft would 
provide both critical functions needed for AIRCOM. 
The purchase of the CF-18 in early 1980 soon began to filter into the US and 
some in Congress soon began to wonder if the CF-18 was the best aircraft for Canada to 
purchase for NORAD operations. For much of the Cold War, the CF had devoted most of 
its air resources to air interception and combat forces. However, to become a joint partner 
in the defence of North America, Canada would have to acquire the type of military 
equipment that would allow it to work closely with the Americans in both air and 
maritime defence.233 This increased cooperation was characterized by the interest the 
USAF took in Canada’s acquisition of a new fighter aircraft. Speaking before a 
congressional sub-committee in September 1981, USAF Colonel Robert Carlberg argued 
that the F-18 was a good aircraft that would allow the Canadian Air Command to 
adequately “defend the northern borders of the United States.”234 While there was no 
evidence of direct USAF involvement in the NFA program, this statement by a USAF 
colonel effectively showed the importance they put on the necessity of a new Canadian 
fighter aircraft. Colonel Carlberg’s statement also showed an increasing interoperability 
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between the USAF and Air Command as he did not distinguish one from the other but 
instead views them as one large force designed to protect North American airspace.  
Congress also began to take an interest in the equipment that Ottawa was 
purchasing for Air Command. As early as 1978 the US Congressional Budget Office 
heavily debated the merits of Canada’s purchase of the P-3C Orion ASW aircraft for 
long-range patrol of North American coastlines. Their conclusion was that the aircraft 
represented “a major contribution of land-based aviation to anti-submarine warfare” and 
that Canada would need more to adequately protect North America.235 While USAF 
officials defended Canada’s air defence contribution to North America, they also began 
to place pressure, both official and unofficial, on NDHQ and the Prime Minister’s Office 
to adopt American air defence proposals. 
Officials from the USAF and Air Command had worked very closely together 
since the signing of NORAD in 1957. Throughout the next two decades this relationship 
was used to help provide Air Command with the abilities to defend Canadian airspace 
from external threats. However, with increasing tensions between the superpowers, the 
USAF began to place an increasing importance on Air Command’s ability to assist them 
in its defensive strategies. A number of USAF proposals strongly emphasized the 
reshaping of Air Command along American lines. Two proposals in particular 
highlighted the new direct attitude the USAF was taking in regards to the needs of Air 
Command. 
The first proposal, an unofficial one, had been submitted to AIRCOM in 1979 and 
suggested that Canada purchase either the F-14 or F-15 fighter in order to help the USAF 
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and USN defend the North Atlantic sea-lanes from Soviet aircraft.236 This proposal was 
followed in 1983 by an official proposal submitted from Washington, on behalf of USAF 
strategic planners, to the Canadian federal government requesting that Canada purchase 
up to twelve E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft and five squadrons of F-15 fighters for 
continental defence.237 Furthermore, the Americans suggested that the previously 
purchased CF-18 fighters be transferred to assist the USAF in Western Europe.238 Not 
only would these proposals increase the strength of Air Command, but they would also 
increase the strength directly available to assist the USAF in a major conflict. Despite 
both of these proposals being rejected by Ottawa, it signaled to the federal government 
that the US wanted Canada to take on a larger role in both North American and NATO 
defence.  
 While Air Command did have units stationed with American squadrons in 
Germany, it mostly cooperated with the USAF in the defence of North America through 
NORAD.  In the eyes of many American air force officials, a strengthened Air Command 
would help free up American air units for other military commitments.239 Not only did 
the USAF have to designate sufficient air defence forces to defend both American and 
Canadian airspace, but they also had to be prepared to designate aircraft to help the small 
Air Command transport fleet fly Canadian soldiers and equipment to Europe. In addition 
to publicly demanding that Ottawa upgrade its fighter fleet, the USAF also wanted 
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Canada to upgrade its ageing air transport fleet.240 Not only would this increase the 
aircraft available to the USAF in a major conflict, but it would also free up valuable 
USAF assets to transport American soldiers and equipment across the globe.241 It was 
clear that with the end of détente the USAF wanted Canada to take on a greater role in its 
own security as they no longer wanted to reserve significant conventional forces for the 
defence of Canada. For the first time since the late 1950s, the US military was taking 
direct action to help the CF rebuild its strength. This new action by the USAF, however, 
was designed to bring Canadian air units into the larger American military strategies and 
plans for the defence of Europe and not North America. 
 Since 1968 the Canadian Forces had been oriented towards the continental 
defence of North America and away from Europe. This was especially true in regards to 
Air Command, which Trudeau saw as being the main force in protecting Canadian 
sovereignty. Unlike their northern neighbours, however, the USAF had never placed 
continental defence as a high priority and did not want to devote substantial resources to 
its defence.242 Beginning in the early 1980s, the US began to become more concerned 
about Canada’s European defence contributions than its share of North American 
defence.243 The new direct approach that the USAF was taking with Air Command was 
designed to increase Canada’s military commitments to Europe and not North America. 
 A strong example of this new American desire was the proposal of USAF 
strategic planners regarding the defence of Iceland.  Iceland was considered extremely 
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important in the defence of the North Atlantic sea-lanes. Throughout the years it had 
become the sole responsibility of the USAF and USN to defend the island and provide 
fighters and ASW aircraft to the island in the event of hostilities. However, with the 
increasing military preference moving away from nuclear and towards conventional 
warfare, the USAF wished to divest itself of this commitment and looked towards the CF 
to take it up. American defence academic Paul George argued in 1982 that Canada take 
over the defence of Iceland, which would free up US Marines and Air Force assets for 
European defence.244 It was also suggested that Canadian CF-18 fighters and Aurora 
ASW aircraft take over for their American counterparts on Iceland in the defence of the 
North Atlantic.245 Not only would this free up American assets but it would also help the 
US redirect Canadian military priorities towards Europe and away from North America. 
At the same time it would place Air Command in an important ASW and interceptor role 
in the middle of the NATO sea-lanes.  
While these arguments did have considerable support within elements of the US 
military, they did not hold any standing with senior American and Canadian military and 
defence officials. The US was not interested in handing over control of the defence of 
Iceland, which the Pentagon considered to be a key cog in NATO defence, to any of its 
allies. They would welcome Canadian support in the defence of Iceland but it would 
remain under US command. Despite these proposed plans never coming to fruition it did 
show a major effort by the Canadian and US governments to find an important position 
for Air Command outside of North America that also played into its two main strengths, 
air-to-air interception and anti-submarine warfare. 
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 Finding a position for AIRCOM outside of North America was an opinion that 
was not only held by USAF officials but also by officials within Air Command.  With an 
increasing priority being placed on conventional military forces by the US government, 
Canadian air force officials began to realize that their American allies would no longer 
settle for the laissez-faire attitude given to defence by previous governments. Brigadier-
General Claude La France of Air Command illustrated this new attitude between 
Canadian and American air force officials to pressure Ottawa into reshaping Canada’s 
conventional assets at a SCEAND meeting in 1985. At this meeting, General La France 
argued that détente was over and that Canada would quickly lose influence with the 
Americans unless the government provided the CF with the equipment and manpower to 
make a significant contribution to American and NATO defence.246 At another SCEAND 
meeting in 1985, Canadian defence analyst Stephen Clarkson argued that Canada had a 
further bilateral commitment to the US to rebuild the capabilities of the CF. This was 
because of the advanced degree of integration that the CF, particularly Air Command, 
had achieved in the US military structure and American strategic plans.247 If Canada 
wanted to maintain an influence with the USAF in the defence of North America, it 
would have to provide Air Command with the assets to make an identifiable contribution 
to American and NATO defence.   
However, the USAF also wanted Canada to increase NORAD cooperation that 
would give the USAF access to Canadian facilities, equipment, and airspace. One of the 
most important events regarding USAF influence on Air Command was the NORAD 
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renewal process that occurred in 1985 and 1986. The difference between this NORAD 
renewal and previous agreements was that the USAF wanted direct access to Canadian 
airspace and facilities as well as an increase in Canadian air defence forces. On 18 March 
1985 at the Quebec Summit, newly-elected Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President 
Ronald Reagan released a statement to the public that effectively illustrated the new 
defence dynamic between the two allies: “We are neighbours and allies dedicated to the 
defence and nourishment of peace and freedom. The security of Canada and the United 
States are inextricably linked.”248 This statement was very significant as it was unlike 
previous Canadian government statements, which often went to great pains to illustrate 
the independence of the CF and Canada from the US Armed Forces. 
 This meeting was soon followed by the release of the NORAD 1986 report by 
AIRCOM and the Ministry of National Defence.  Despite the importance this document 
placed on the role of Air Command in North American defence, it also showed the 
increasing cooperation between Air Command and the USAF in both North America and 
Europe. The report identified that the Canadian and American air forces had begun to 
place an emphasis on interoperability and cooperation instead of strictly focusing on the 
protection of sovereign airspace. It stated that training exercises held between Air 
Command and USAF placed its main priorities to developing “interoperability, 
standardization of procedures, and training under different climatic conditions and levels 
of threat.”249 Furthermore, the report identified that both air forces had developed 
procedures to support each other at both home and abroad. The USAF was prepared to 
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support Canadian operations with land and tactical air support that would be provided by 
US REDCOM, the Alaska Air Command, or the Joint Task Force, Alaska.250 In order to 
get the Canadian government to adopt USAF strategies and plans regarding European and 
North Atlantic defence, American officials made it clear that any American air units 
operating on Canadian soil would come under the command of Canadian air force 
officials.251 This was a significant step by American military officials, who had 
previously been adamant about US forces in Canada operating under American and not 
Canadian national command. However, if Canada would not shift its focus away from 
continental defence, then the USAF made it clear that it would have to move significant 
forces onto Canadian territory to ensure the defence of North America. 
 One of the major issues facing continued AIRCOM-USAF cooperation was the 
heavily debated NORAD renewal, about which a decision was needed by the spring of 
1986. Throughout 1985 the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National 
Defence heavily debated the pros and cons of renewing or rejecting the NORAD renewal 
in 1986. The main point of opposition among members of SCEAND, the Canadian public 
and Members of Parliament was the US Strategic Defense Initiative initiated by President 
Reagan in 1981. The SDI was an undertaking that Reagan tasked to all branches of the 
US military to develop ground and spaced base defence systems designed to destroy any 
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) fired at the US.252 It was argued that the 
original NORAD Agreement was simply to protect Canadian and American airspace 
from attack by Soviet bombers or cruise missiles and that the SDI went outside of this 
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agreement. Many in the Canadian public believed that the US SDI was being designed so 
as to enable the US to conduct a first-strike against the Soviet Union while also being 
able to defend itself against any Soviet retaliatory nuclear strikes.253 As a result, many of 
the witnesses representing public pressure groups argued that Canadian air defence units 
would be used to help defend the US from a retaliatory strike that Washington had 
initiated.254 Despite this fear, members of the CF who were brought in front of the 
Committee argued that NORAD needed to be renewed for the protection of Canada. 
Canadian AIRCOM Brigadier-General Claude La France contended that NORAD 
was beneficial to Canada and it needed to be renewed. He argued that while the SDI was 
designed to provide a greater defence of North America from a potential Soviet first-
strike, the US was not demanding Canadian participation. He further stated that the 
USAF had even opted to include a clause in the NORAD renewal stating that Canada 
would not be asked to participate in the program unless Ottawa requested it.255 
Participation with the US through NORAD had been vital to Canadian defence since it 
was introduced in 1957, and AIRCOM officials made it clear that without NORAD it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for Canada to defend its own airspace and provide 
aircraft to NATO. General La France argued that AIRCOM would not be able to properly 
defend Canadian airspace with all 138 newly purchased CF-18 fighters, let alone provide 
aircraft for contingencies within NATO.256 As a result, AIRCOM needed NORAD to 
enable it fulfill its basic objectives of protecting Canada’s sovereignty.  
                                                
253 Canada, SCEAND: Order of Reference Respecting NORAD, Issue no. 48 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
November 21, 1985) in evidence from Mr. Bill Robinson, 6. 
254 Ibid., 6. 
255 Canada, SCEAND: Order of Reference Respecting NORAD, Issue no. 39 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
October 15, 1985) in evidence from Brig.-Gen. Claude La France, 34.	  
256 Canada, SCEAND, Issue No. 39 (October 15, 1985) in evidence from Brig.-Gen. Claude La France, 38. 
 111 
The result of these arguments in SCEAND was that the committee sided with the 
CF and recommended that the Mulroney government strive for two important goals in the 
NORAD Renewal Agreement. The first was that the government should negotiate with 
the US a joint arrangement for the air and naval defence of the Arctic Ocean; the second 
was for Canada and the US to take further steps to better integrate their command, control 
and communication systems with respect to the air and maritime defence of North 
America.257 With the approval of the NORAD renewal by SCEAND, Mulroney’s 
Minister of Defence Erik Nielsen and his successor, Perrin Beatty, worked to renew 
NORAD with the US. With the approval of Parliament, Mulroney and Beatty worked 
with President Reagan and the US Department of Defense to renew NORAD, which was 
officially renewed in March of 1986.   
However, even while the renewal agreement was being debated by Canadian 
politicians, the CF and USAF were working to better prepare for a Soviet assault on 
North America. Through the NORAD renewal discussions, the USAF had effectively 
gained access to Canadian Air Command facilities, personnel and equipment. While this 
was acceptable to Canadian government and military officials, the proposed plan outlined 
by American General Abrahamson, the commander of the US Strategic Defense Initiative 
Office, in early 1985 was not. General Abrahamson made it clear to American 
government officials that to successfully defend North America the USAF would have to 
deploy a substantial number of fighter squadrons, AWACS aircraft, radar, and air defence 
missiles to the Canadian north.258 He argued that there was no point in keeping these 
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forces in the US if they would have to be moved into Canada to be used effectively.259 
The 1987 White Paper, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada, stated 
that the USAF would forward deploy America AWACS aircraft to Canadian air bases on 
a regular basis while USAF interceptors would be dispatched to Canada during a crisis.260 
For years Air Command had been adopting USAF strategies and doctrines while the 
politicians in Ottawa pushed it towards cooperation with the USAF that was so close 
many believed Air Command was being integrated into the American air force. 
General Abrahamson had made it clear that Canada had committed Air Command 
to assisting the USAF in both the defence of North America and the defence of Western 
Europe. This American air force official was simply stating that his suggestion could 
become a possibility because of the increasing relationship between the two armed 
forces. Since Washington had taken an increased interest in the rebuilding of the CF in 
late 1979, the Canadian military had been inching itself closer and working on integrating 
key elements with the US Armed Forces in order to enhance, not infringe, Canadian 
sovereignty.261 While Air Command received a lot of attention from politicians and the 
public because of its role in NORAD and protecting Canadian sovereignty, it was not 
alone and was simply part of a larger trend that affected all branches of the Canadian 
Forces and ultimately led to direct cooperation with the US. 
Mobile Command and the US Army 
 Unlike Air Command, which focused mostly on North America, Mobile 
Command had focused on its various commitments to NATO in Western Europe and to 
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United Nations operations. With the low priority that the Trudeau government had placed 
on NATO defence for most of the 1970s, Mobile Command was severely depleted. By 
1981 it was in need of a major upgrade for most of its systems and needed highly trained 
personnel to help replace the thousands that it had lost since 1967. With the land forces 
being continually ignored, the forces in Europe, or bound for Europe in the event of 
hostilities, had begun to work very closely with their American Army counterparts to 
help ensure Canada’s role in the defence of Western Europe and North America.  
With the general lack of interest showed by the federal government, Mobile 
Command’s leaders had developed a keen insight into the American Army and USMC 
and had begun to adjust their forces in order to cooperate very closely with the 
Americans in a war scenario. When Brian Mulroney took office as the new Prime 
Minister in September 1984 he found a Mobile Command that was constantly trying to 
adjust its plans and forces to strategic plans and trends coming out of the Pentagon.262 
While the Mulroney Government recognized the depleted state of Mobile Command, it 
was officials of the Reagan Administration and the American military who began to push 
the new Progressive Government to restore the capabilities and manpower that Canada’s 
land forces were sorely lacking. 
In a situation that was very similar to what had happened to the 4CMBG in 
Germany in the 1970s, the US Army began to work very closely with Mobile Command 
in an attempt to restructure Canadian defence plans for Western Europe. By 1983 Canada 
was responsible for committing 4CMBG in Germany, which was to grow to a light 
division in a crisis, and a CAST Brigade with air support to Norway.263 Seeing the dismal 
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shape of Mobile Command, many officials of the US Army began to argue that Canada 
needed to reshape its focus on one area of Europe and not two. These same officials 
began to push Canadian defence officials to move out of Central Germany and only focus 
on Norway.264 Soon these Canadian military officials began to pressure the Mulroney 
Government, who began to see the benefits that Canada could reap by agreeing to this 
new American strategic plan. However, the Americans did not do this to help Canada but 
instead did it to simply free up valuable American conventional forces. 
With the evident disdain of the détente policy by the Reagan Administration, the 
emphasis was beginning to move away from nuclear and towards conventional military 
forces. As these forces were expensive to maintain and operate, the US began to look 
towards its allies to take up part of the defence. President Reagan began to place an 
increased emphasis on the view that prosperous allies needed to assume greater military 
responsibilities in the defence of NATO.265 With this new policy in mind, American 
Army and Marine planners believed that if they could transfer Canadian land forces to the 
defence of Norway, they could free up forces to defend Germany. One of these principle 
assets was a USMC Expeditionary Brigade that had been promised to Norway with the 
Canadian CAST Brigade.266 In addition, the Canadian CAST Brigade and other forces 
dedicated to Norway had become an integral part of Washington’s plans for the defence 
of Europe. Even though the CAST Brigade had never fully deployed to Norway, it was 
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this commitment that the Americans took an intense interest in and wanted to integrate 
into its own forces in Northern Europe. 
In the summer of 1984 the Reagan Administration pressed hard to restructure the 
force commitments to different areas of Europe. One of the major areas that Washington 
wanted restructured was the Canadian-American military units destined for Norway. As 
part of this desire, the US Army was instructed to create plans that would transform US 
light infantry units and Canadian Forces destined for Norway into robust, rapidly 
deployable military formations.267 In order to rapidly transport these forces over to 
Norway, the Pentagon also wanted a pooling of Canadian and American strategic sea and 
airlift capabilities, which basically became a way for including Canadian units into 
American troop deployment plans.268 The initial American plans attempted to maximize 
the available forces in Norway, and they also attempted to integrate the Canadian air, 
land, and naval units destined to Norway with their own forces. By creating these plans, it 
would help move the forces to Norway fast and efficiently, which would have had a large 
impact on the defence of Northern Europe in a time of increased hostilities. However, 
while these plans were created using existing forces destined for Norway, other informal 
plans created by American government and military officials called for the restructuring 
of Mobile Command along American lines. 
Despite not yet being deployed as an entire brigade to its primary theatre of 
Norway, American military officials had integrated the CAST commitment into US 
military efforts for the defence of Europe. American defence analyst John L. Lellenberg 
made its importance to the US military evident in a meeting of American and Canadian 
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military officials in 1985. Lellenberg argued that the CAST commitment “is of the size, 
training and equipment needed to have a major impact on the battle and is also 
experienced in the Arctic conditions of Norway…it has significant fire support, anti-
armor potential...and has some organic air defence.”269 In order to ensure that the Brigade 
would be committed to Norway, the Americans teamed it up with a USMC Brigade.  
It was believed that placing the Canadian brigade with a mobile American brigade 
would help shape Canada’s commitment as well as show the American commitment to 
working closely with the Canadians. Furthermore, the organic air and sealift capabilities 
available to this USMC brigade would be able to help assist the transportation of the men 
and equipment of the CAST group to Norway.270 However, the US wanted to go further 
and pressed for the Canadian land forces to be restructured along American lines. If 
Canadian land forces could be structured on American lines than these units would be 
able to easily integrate into larger US divisions, corps and army groups in Europe and 
North America. 
Officially, American government and military officials rarely questioned the role 
of the CF in NATO and instead focused on trying to get their European allies to increase 
military spending and manpower. Unofficially, however, members of the US Armed 
Forces wanted the CF to be restructured in order to better fit in with American units that 
they often worked side-by-side with. One of these unofficial proposals came about in late 
1984 in the form of transformation of Mobile Command into American-style light-
infantry units. First, it was argued that it would be cheaper to maintain light-infantry 
forces than heavy armoured formations and would also give Ottawa a greater military 
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flexibility in sovereignty and UN operations.271 Both Canadian and American defence 
officials realized that the Canadian government had fiscal limitations and concerns over 
military interaction between the two North American neighbours.  
Despite these concerns, Mobile Command conducted a study in the early 1980s to 
examine the feasibility of turning 4CMBG into a unit similar to a US Army Cavalry 
brigade, which was rapidly transportable and had both mechanized and heavy armour 
units.272  Although this study was appealing to many in Mobile Command and CFE, it 
was rejected by NDHQ on the grounds that reorganizing Canadian forces to facilitate 
their incorporation into a US Army division would undermine Ottawa’s desire to 
maintain a separate and distinctive Canadian identity in the CF.273 However, they also 
believed that this structure would help support American military objectives in Europe 
and at the same time provide Ottawa with greater flexibility of its land forces that they 
could use for inherent Canadian concerns. Furthermore, Mobile Command, which did not 
wish to lose its heavy armoured capabilities, did not have any desire to switch to a light 
infantry structure. They had successfully fought proposals from Defence Ministers Paul 
Hellyer and Donald Macdonald in the 1960s and 1970s that similarly wanted Mobile 
Command to adopt a light-infantry structure. As a result, many military commanders in 
Mobile Command assumed that this, and subsequent studies, were designed to have 
Mobile Command solely focus on Norwegian defence so that US Army and USMC units 
could be designated for other areas of Europe.  
While the US and NATO considered the CAST commitment a key component of 
Norwegian defence, Mobile Command had always considered it as an utter failure and 
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the forces could be used elsewhere. Since the Canadian government agreed to CAST 
deployment in Northern Europe in 1968, Mobile Command did not believe it could be 
successfully achieved, as Canada did not have its own organic air and sealift capabilities 
to transport it to Norway in time for the start of hostilities. As a result, the CAST 
deployment would always be dependent on Allied transport capabilities, which would 
already be severely strained in a crisis situation. In August 1986 the entire CAST brigade 
with its supporting elements deployed to Norway for the first and only time in 
OPERATION BRAVE LION.274 To transport and deploy the entire brigade group took 
thirty days, which was the projected length of any war in Europe between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact.275 The failure of this exercise soon forced Defence Minister Beatty to 
reconsider the CAST commitment altogether.  NATO strategists argued throughout 1984 
and 1985 that to successfully defend Norway both the US and Canada would have to 
accomplish a number of important goals. 
With the emphasis no longer on nuclear warfare but on conventional weapons, 
European NATO members, mainly Norway and Denmark, wanted both Canada and the 
US to take on a greater role in the defence of Norway and Northern Europe. They 
identified a number of items that both countries would have to work out in order to 
successfully defend Norway. First of all, they argued that Canadian land forces would 
have to be reoriented towards Norway and the Americans would have to enhance the 
capabilities of their light infantry divisions.276 In addition, the European NATO nations 
wanted the two North American countries to create an integrated deployment plan, which 
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would depend primarily upon American air and sealift capabilities with Canadian naval 
escort vessels.277 Indeed, Canadian-American land forces did cooperate closely within 
North America, even though there was very little land threat to that continent. Despite 
these European desires, Bill McKnight, the Minister of Defence from January 1989 to 
April 1991, announced in November 1989 that the CAST commitment would be 
disbanded. He announced that the forces designated for it would be reoriented to 
Canada’s commitment in CENTAG as well as to Allied Command Europe Mobile Force- 
Land (ACE) in Denmark and northern Germany. 
In addition to this close cooperation in North America and Europe, Mobile 
Command was beginning to adopt many of the US Army’s warfare strategies and 
doctrines for conflict in both North America and Western Europe. During the mid-1980s 
Mobile Command worked closely with the US Army in training to implement two 
important military plans, should the need for them have arisen: the Canada-US Land 
Operation Plan (LANDOP) and the continued development of the AirLand Battle 
Doctrine. Prime Ministers Trudeau and Mulroney began to recognize that American 
security requirements essentially bound Canada to American military concepts and 
strategies.278 Both of these plans were important to the conventional American military 
planning for both North America and Europe, and it quickly became clear that Mobile 
Command needed to closely cooperate with the US Army if these plans were to succeed.  
While LANDOP had been designed by the two militaries as early as the 1960s, it 
came to take on a larger role in the 1980s when both NATO and the Warsaw Pact moved 
away from nuclear conflict and began to focus their efforts on conventional military 
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forces. As a result, the US Army and Mobile Command practiced the implementation of 
LANDOP on an annual basis. The LANDOP plan called for the use of both Canadian and 
American land units in the defence of continental North America.279 Despite there being 
no immediate threat to North America from an enemy ground force, LANDOP also 
provided the framework for both the Canadian and American ground forces to develop 
important procedures and interoperability, which could both be used in any potential 
conflicts in Europe or across the globe. 
The training that both Canadian and American ground forces had in North 
America also focused on the implementation of the US AirLand Battle Doctrine in any 
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe. The AirLand Battle Doctrine that had been 
developed by the US Army during the early 1980s focused on how American and NATO 
forces would be able to win any conventional war with the numerically superior Warsaw 
Pact forces in Europe. The implementation of this doctrine was also a significant element 
of the combined training exercises held between Canadian and US forces in both North 
America and Europe. This plan emphasized that the armoured unit was the most 
important element of modern warfare, but for them to be used successfully they had to be 
supported by infantry, artillery, engineers and close-air support.280 Furthermore, this 
doctrine laid out what equipment was needed and how the forces were to be organized for 
the plan to be successful.281 As 4CMBG was to be a reserve part of the US CENTAG, it 
became necessary for Mobile Command to become familiar with this US plan. In 
conjunction with this plan, and to ensure that Canada would be able to operate with the 
US Army in the event this plan was initiated, Mobile Command developed a plan to 
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rapidly reinforce 4CMBG to allow it to take on a significant role in this new US doctrine. 
This new reorganization went hand-in-hand with AirLand Battle Doctrine and was 
designed to allow the Canadians to assist the US in the implementation of this plan.  
Throughout the 1980s Mobile Command worked closely with the US Army and 
USMC in order to make the best possible contribution to the defence of NATO with the 
limited resources available to it. Despite finding that the CAST commitment was a total 
failure, resulting in its disbandment in 1989, Mobile Command redirected these forces to 
the US CENTAG in Germany. Furthermore, through annual exercises in both Europe and 
North America, Canadian and American land forces continued to develop a highly 
integrated set of procedures, tactics, equipment and training that had begun as early as 
1962. 
Maritime Command and a New Canadian Naval Defence Stance 
While Mobile Command was focused on working with the American army in 
Europe and North America, Maritime Command was faced with both increased 
cooperation with the USN and an increase in criticism from the USN because of new 
naval defence plans put forward by Prime Minister Mulroney and his Cabinet. As a result 
of the lack of funding and the decreased emphasis on conventional forces by the Trudeau 
government throughout the 1970s, Maritime Command began the 1980s in extremely dire 
straits. MARCOM began the 1980s with a vital relationship with the USN in which 
American vessels often supported Canadian naval task forces and Canadian vessels 
worked almost exclusively on ASW operations in the North Atlantic. However, by the 
end of the 1980s this extremely close relationship between the two navies grew into one 
of the great Canadian military controversies of the Cold War–the decision by the 
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Mulroney Government to purchase nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) for Maritime 
Command. Despite this controversy the cooperation between the USN and Maritime 
Command emphasized the influence that the US military had on both the Canadian 
government and armed forces throughout the decade. 
 It became clear to the Trudeau government in early 1980 that they could no longer 
ignore the needs and forces of Maritime Command. This became a reality in the summer 
of 1980 with a demand by Canada’s NATO allies, most specifically the US, for Ottawa to 
significantly upgrade and improve its forces. On 30 July 1980, NATO commanders in 
Brussels and Norfolk assigned Canada a new naval mission to train for in the event of a 
major conflict. This task was for Maritime Command to focus on anti-air and anti-surface 
capabilities designed to help escort USN aircraft carrier Strike Groups across the Atlantic 
where they could strike Soviet naval bases.282 NATO naval commanders wanted Canada 
to field three such naval task forces by the end of 1987.283 It was clear that the USN and 
Canada’s European allies wanted the Trudeau government to significantly improve its 
naval forces that were sorely lacking in almost every category. However, while Canada’s 
NATO European allies wanted Canada to take on a larger role, they did not realize just 
how dependent Canada’s naval forces had become on the USN as a result of constant 
budget cuts and force reductions during the tumultuous years of the previous decade. 
 The USN had long been after Ottawa to improve Canada’s naval forces and found 
a new opportunity with the new demands made upon Canada by the NATO council in 
Brussels. While NATO made these new demands and objectives for Maritime Command 
clear to the Canadian government, they also failed to realize the lack of existing 
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capabilities of the Canadian navy. Soon after Trudeau agreed to the new NATO naval 
plans, Canadian naval officers made it clear to the federal government that every 
Canadian naval task force that could operate in the Atlantic would need a USN air 
defence frigate or destroyer for air-defence, as that was a capability that Maritime 
Command did not have.284 As Trudeau had scrapped the last Canadian aircraft carrier, 
HMCS Bonaventure, in 1970, naval officials argued that Canada would have three 
options to assist USN task forces and NATO convoys in air defence: provide their 
warships with advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) defence systems, arrange for 
NATO land-based or carrier-based air coverage for their routes, or rely on the air defence 
capabilities of the USN to defend Canadian warships escorting NATO convoys.285 While 
these options were made clear to MARCOM in 1977, it was in 1980 that they were given 
the funding and permission to develop a new Canadian Patrol Frigate for future 
operations. It was on these new vessels that MARCOM officials hoped to develop a 
better ship-based air defence platform. Two of these three options were entirely 
dependent on the forces of the USN, which itself was undergoing a vast change and 
vastly desired that Maritime Command develop its own air defence capabilities. 
 Within NATO, convoy escort and maritime defence of the Atlantic in the early 
1980s were focused on the maritime forces of the RN, USN and Maritime Command. 
However, the election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency resulted in the USN being 
forced away from purely defensive operations and developing a more forward defence 
strategy. Beginning in the summer of 1981, the USN began to concentrate its resources 
on super-carrier battle groups and began to push for its allies, particularly Canada and the 
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UK, to take on the responsibility of convoy protection and ASW operations in the 
Atlantic.286 Maritime defence of the North Atlantic had long been the primary 
responsibility of Canadian and American naval forces. While these two forces worked 
together under the auspices of NATO’s Atlantic Command and not a bilateral agreement, 
they practiced naval operations in the Western Atlantic exclusively together and not with 
other NATO naval forces.  
Canada’s MARCOM began to operate almost exclusively with the US 2nd Fleet in 
the Western Atlantic, while MARPAC worked solely with the US 3rd Fleet, based out of 
Pearl Harbor.287 Canadian naval operations in Canada’s area of responsibility were all 
closely coordinated with those of the American fleets, and the USN provided Maritime 
Command with submarines and helicopters to assist in ASW training when these forces 
were unavailable to Canadian commanders for training.288 With this close working 
relationship and in conjunction with the new US Forward Maritime Defense Strategy in 
1983, the Canadian government was forced to rapidly push forward with a number of 
procurement and shipbuilding plans to rapidly modernize its naval forces. 
 The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, under orders from President Reagan to 
develop a plan to contain the Soviet Navy before it could reach the North Atlantic sea-
lanes in a conflict, developed the American Forward Maritime Defense Strategy.289 
Keeping the North Atlantic sea-lanes open to NATO warships and merchant vessels 
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would be critical in defeating any Soviet invasion of Western Europe. While the USN 
would provide the main offensive forces for this operation, it would need the support of 
its NATO allies in order for the strategy to be truly successful. As a result, American 
naval and government officials began to place increased pressure on their NATO partners 
to rapidly modernize and expand their naval fleets. As the USN was trying to contain the 
Soviet Navy in its bases in northern Russia, ASW and convoy protection would be 
largely dependent on the other NATO allies’ escort vessels. USN commanders saw 
Canada’s commitment of ASW forces to the North Atlantic favourably, as it freed up 
American naval vessels for this new forward defence strategy.290 With this pressure from 
the USN and Reagan administration, Trudeau realized that MARCOM’s current fleet 
needed to be upgraded and a new class of modern frigates was essential. 
 In 1983 the Trudeau government approved the budget and design for the 
Canadian Patrol Frigate Project. The project was awarded to Saint John Shipbuilding and 
Dry Dock Company on 29 June 1983 with a target budget of $2.584 billion.291 This 
project was to introduce a new class of general-purpose frigates, with emphasis on air-
defence and ASW capabilities, into Maritime Command by the middle of the 1980s.292 
With a planned acquisition of twelve state-of-the-art naval frigates, Maritime Command 
would be able to take its role in the USN’s maritime strategy. However, while the naval 
commanders in Halifax and Ottawa applauded this purchase, it also signified that 
Maritime Command would follow its traditional policy of focusing on ASW operations 
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while leaving the larger naval tasks to the Americans. The USN gladly approved of this 
new Canadian proposal, as it would free up American resources for aircraft carriers and 
SSNs while having Canada focus on smaller, less expensive vessels like destroyers and 
frigates.293 Despite the USN’s desire for larger Allied surface fleets, it did not want any 
of its allies to interfere with its own plans and capabilities.  
The USN considered itself as the primary adversary of the Soviet Navy and, 
therefore, discouraged its NATO allies from developing any of their own force projection 
vessels, which could lead to an ally taking on the Soviet Navy without the USN’s 
assistance.294 As a result, Canadian naval commanders and the Trudeau government were 
able to develop a new force structure that was based upon frigates, destroyers and 
maritime surveillance aircraft. Ottawa did not look to purchase any of the larger vessels, 
which were considered too expensive for Maritime Command, and instead would be able 
to integrate its smaller vessels into larger American naval task forces. 
 The rearming of Maritime Command was to become the focal point of newly 
elected Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s defence policy in the fall of 1984. However, 
whereas the Trudeau government had focused on procuring new frigates, destroyers and 
maritime patrol aircraft, Mulroney also began to discuss the possible acquisition of 
nuclear attack submarines for the CF. At the beginning of 1985, NATO and Canadian 
analysts began to propose that the Canadian government purchase SSNs as an alternative 
to building a large number of escort warships.295 It was believed that a fleet of SSNs 
would allow Canada to better defend its NATO maritime commitments as well as 
enabling Maritime Command to help defend important sea-lanes around the globe. 
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However, despite the discussions that went on between analysts, it was not until the 
beginning of 1987 that Mulroney began to seriously consider the purchase of SSNs for 
Maritime Command. It was this announcement in the 1987 Defence White Paper that was 
to lead to the direct involvement of the USN and government in Canadian maritime 
defence to ensure that this purchase would not occur. 
 In June 1987 the Mulroney government released its new defence policy in 
Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada. While many of the items 
outlined in the document were greatly approved of by the US military and government, 
there was one proposal within the document that did not go over well: the purchase of 
nuclear attack submarines. The document argued that a fleet of nuclear-powered 
submarines would enable Canada to better defend her NATO commitments in the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.296 Furthermore, the document stated that these submarines 
would complement Canada’s maritime aircraft and surface ships in a “vivid 
demonstration of Canadian determination to meet challenges” in the Pacific, Atlantic and 
Arctic Oceans.297 While the new policy outlined the Mulroney government’s 
determination to increase the forces available to Maritime Command to enable it to better 
support the American naval forces, the USN argued vehemently against Canada acquiring 
such advanced technology. 
NATO analysts applauded the proposed Canadian purchase. They argued that the 
SSN was a more effective weapon for sea-denial roles in the Atlantic and Pacific than 
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maritime aircraft, diesel submarines and surface warships.298 However, while this 
purchase could help American naval power, the USN immediately began to pressure 
members of its own government to dissuade Ottawa from making this purchase. The 
USN argued in the fall of 1987 through a number of NATO articles that the SSN was a 
power-projection weapon and was not a great weapon for convoy and coastal defence 
operations.299 While the USN expressed their concern of this proposed Canadian naval 
purchase in Congress, they did not make any direct lobbying to either MARCOM 
officials or the Canadian government. Instead, USN officials, particularly USN 
Submarine Command, relied on its supporters in Congress to lobby on their behalf in 
Ottawa. The Americans wanted Maritime Command to continue to focus on operating 
small escort ships and patrol aircraft for ASW operations and not on nuclear powered 
submarines. Washington did not want the other North American nation to acquire SSNs, 
as they would have to share and coordinate the movements of their submarines with 
Ottawa. 
The USN feared that Canadian SSNs would be used to project Canadian 
sovereignty into the Arctic Ocean.300 This Maritime region had been the sole domain of 
American nuclear submarines for several decades and they did not wish to have to share 
this region with another ally, even one so close as Canada. The USN argued that the SSN 
purchase would not be used to defend the Arctic against Soviet forces but would instead 
be used to trail and monitor the activities of USN forces operating in secret.301 They 
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feared that they would have to coordinate their top-secret submarine operations in the 
Arctic with Maritime Command. This belief came from the detailed naval plan called the 
Canada-US Maritime East Operations Order (MAREASTOP). This plan was the basic 
document for East coast operations; however, Ottawa wished to expand this order into the 
Arctic Ocean as well. It calls for the detailed direction and guidance for coordinated 
naval operations of both countries and also calls for mutual maritime training and a 
command-and-control relationship between the two navies.302 If Canada were to acquire 
these submarines and expand the plan into the Arctic, it would force the USN to 
coordinate their submarine routes and patrol areas with Canada’s submarine 
commanders. 
 It was made clear in the 1987 Defence White Paper that Canada needed this new 
weapon to help it maintain the sovereignty of its Arctic. While the document focused on 
defending Canada from Soviet naval forces, it also stated that the SSN program would 
strengthen Canadian sovereignty as they could monitor the many activities of USN 
submarines in the Arctic.303 Indeed, Canadian naval analyst John Harbron argued in a 
series of articles that if Canada did not acquire submarines to defend the Arctic then it 
would continue to be the sole domain of USN submarines.304 It was argued among 
NATO analysts during 1987 and 1988 that this acquisition would provide NATO with an 
improved defensive ability in the Western Atlantic. NATO analyst Joel Sokolosky stated 
that the USN wanted Canada to continue to focus on air and surface ASW forces; 
however, he also pointed out that these submarines would enable USN SSNs to move 
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into forward defensive positions and would improve the allied position in naval rear 
areas.305 Despite the USN not directly lobbying the Mulroney Government or MARCOM 
commanders, they still attempted to influence the purchase by lobbying Congress to 
nullify the purchase. As the projected winner of the SSN Acquisition Program was the 
British Trafalgar Class, USN officials pressured Congress to nullify this sale, as it would 
involve sensitive American built nuclear technology.306 While the USN had an agreement 
with the RN, they did not have one with MARCOM and, therefore, argued that the 
nuclear technology aboard the Trafalgar Class could not be sold without American 
permission.307 Despite the intense lobbying the USN was conducting in Congress to 
nullify this deal, the Mulroney Government continued to press on with the planned 
purchase. 
 The Canadian and American naval forces had developed a long history of 
working closely together in NATO and non-NATO naval operations. However, the USN 
had a well-earned reputation for often getting its demands and proposals passed in 
Washington, which ensured that any dealings the CF or Ottawa had on SSNs with the 
Americans difficult during 1987-88.308 US defence analysts pointed out to Maritime 
Command in 1988 that Canadian ties to the USN were exclusively with the surface fleet 
and that the US submarine fleet did not welcome Canadian cooperation in the Arctic.309 
Furthermore, the USN argued that their SSN operations in the Arctic and around the 
globe were classified and that if they were forced to coordinate their movements with 
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Canadian SSNs then it would be easy for the Soviets to intercept these movements and 
plans.310  Despite all the advantages that SSNs could bring to the defence of North 
America and NATO sea-lanes, the US refused to budge from their stance.  
In April 1989, Minister of Defence Bill McKnight announced a series of defence 
cuts in the Canadian federal budget. Among the items that were cut from the CF was the 
funding made available to purchase the nuclear attack submarines.311 This was seen 
favorably in Washington as it continued to allow US nuclear submarines free reign in the 
Arctic Ocean.312 While the SSN acquisition program was soon forgotten, it is a clear 
example of the US military taking direct involvement in the rebuilding of the Canadian 
Forces during the 1980s. For the previous two decades the USN had always provided 
encouragement and support for their Canadian counterparts from afar, they were now 
taking direct measures with Maritime Command to ensure that it did not acquire SSNs.  
Conclusion 
The beginning of the 1980s signaled a new era for the Canadian Forces. For the 
first time in nearly two decades, the dismal shape of the military was the centre of 
attention in Ottawa. The 1980s also brought with it an end to the policy of détente 
between the US and USSR. With its end came an increased aspiration for conventional 
forces. As the CF was in such a dilapidated state, it was clear to all involved that it would 
have to be ‘rebuilt’ in order to satisfy the security concerns of Washington. The 
successive governments of Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney worked closely with their 
American ally to ensure that the CF could make a useful contribution to North American 
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and NATO defence. However, with the new equipment and priority the CF also saw 
increased participation with their US counterparts in all aspects of defence. 
 Air Command began to immediately see an increased working relationship with 
the USAF that continued throughout the decade. While Ottawa was concerning itself with 
renewing the NORAD Agreement, the USAF worked Air Command to find a position 
that played to AIRCOM’s strength in NATO defence. They also pressured the Canadian 
government to purchase F-14 and F-15 fighters along with E-3A Sentry AWACS for the 
defence of both North America and the proposed defence of Iceland. The USAF clearly 
wanted Air Command to develop more capabilities, which would then free up USAF 
units for other duties. In addition to wanting Air Command rebuilt along American lines, 
the USAF also pressured for, and received, permission to develop contingency bases 
throughout the Canadian North for their aircraft. Although the Canadian government 
rejected the US proposals for the defence of Iceland and the composition of its air force, 
the NORAD Agreement was re-signed and Air Command took on an increased 
participation with the USAF in both North America and Europe. 
 Unlike Air Command, Mobile Command was almost entirely focused on the 
defence of Western Europe. It did this by working in conjunction with the US Army and 
USMC units it was designated to support. In a situation similar to Air Command 
Washington directly pressured the Canadian military and government leaders to 
reorganize Mobile Command into units similar to the new US Army light divisions that 
were coming into being. Furthermore, the Americans forced Mobile Command to accept 
the new American AirLand Battle Doctrine for the defence of NATO. Once again Mobile 
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Command found itself forced to working very closely with the US land forces in both 
Europe and North America. 
 Finally, Maritime Command found itself at the centre of a major dispute between 
Ottawa and Washington concerning new Canadian defence plans. While Canadian 
vessels and maritime aircraft often worked with large USN task forces on ASW and 
convoy protection duties, it was now faced with the direct involvement of USN officials 
in its own naval plans. Prime Minister Mulroney worked very hard to purchase a number 
of nuclear-attack submarines for Maritime Command, which would have substantially 
increased its capabilities. However, the USN viewed this as a potential threat to its own 
submarine operations in the Arctic and worked hard to prevent Ottawa from making this 
purchase. In the end Mulroney was forced to cancel the project because of financial 
limitations, but the proposed acquisition and the US response showed the American 
desire to keep MARCOM out of the Arctic Ocean and simply wanted it to continue in 
providing escort ships for larger American task forces and convoys.  
The 1980s was signaled by the buildup of conventional forces in both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact, along with a more hardline stance on the USSR and its allies by NATO 
political leaders. The new US Government under President Ronald Reagan began to 
heavily buildup the US conventional military forces and began to pressure its allies to do 
the same. The governments of Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney once again pushed the 
Canadian Forces into ever-closer cooperation with their US counterparts. In order to 
protect Canada from unwanted US protection both governments undertook a series of 
expensive equipment purchases for the CF. While these provided the military with the 
state-of-the-art systems it needed to protect Canadian sovereignty, they also pushed the 
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CF into a closer stance with the US. Even though these purchases were expensive it 
allowed the Trudeau and Mulroney Cabinets to work without a lot of US criticism, unlike 
its NATO allies in Europe. Furthermore, Ottawa was able to keep its defence budget 
relatively stable between 1.7% and 1.8% of GDP while most of NATO were significantly 
raising their defence budgets in both relative terms and as a percentage of their GDP.  
 With the rapid increase of the US military by Reagan, Ottawa was able to keep its 
force numbers relatively stable and focus its forces on defending strategic locations 
important to the US within both North America and NATO. By accomplishing this goal 
and acquiescing to US demands for modern equipment for the CF, the Trudeau and 
Mulroney governments were able to increase the combat capabilities of the CF as well as 
satisfy the US demands that Canada was taking its military defence seriously. This also 
enabled both governments to ward off any potential sovereignty problems by having to 
depend on US aircraft and naval vessels to defend sovereign Canadian airspace and 
waterways. By increasing the dollars available to the CF the Trudeau and Mulroney 
Cabinets had accomplished the same two goals of their predecessors over the previous 
two decades: a) ensuring Canadian sovereignty by showing the US that Ottawa cared 
about military defence and; b) keeping Canadian defence budgets relatively stable by 
having the CF work closely with the US military and adopting American military 
methods within the CF.    
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Conclusion 
On 3 December 1989, American President George H.W. Bush and Soviet General 
Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev met at the Malta Summit and 
declared that the Cold War was over.313 With the rapidly thawing relations between the 
US-led West and the Soviet Union, many NATO nations subsequently began to rapidly 
decrease the size and budget of their militaries. Canada was no different, and with the 
election of Jean Chretien as the Prime Minister in 1993, the Canadian Forces saw their 
budget and size rapidly reduced. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Chretien, the CF 
participation with the US military rapidly dwindled as Ottawa, along with most of its 
NATO allies, no longer perceived any large-scale threat to their national security. What 
was to become known by members of the CF and the Canadian defence community as 
the ‘Decade of Darkness’ almost resulted in the temporary halt of Canadian-American 
military relations.314 Indeed, Canada was far from the only NATO nation who conducted 
a rapid reduction in its conventional military forces, as with the raison d’être of the 
Alliance gone, NATO itself began to come under threat of being dismantled. 
The end of the Cold War and the election of Chretien almost signaled the end of 
the intricate defence relations between the two North American neighbours that had been 
developed and refined for over forty years. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both 
the Mulroney and Chretien governments were able to redirect funds destined for the CF 
towards social welfare programs, healthcare and education.315 The military reforms that 
had been undertaken in the 1980s were quickly thrown to the wayside as the military 
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experienced a rapid force reduction similar to that which was going on throughout 
NATO, including the US.  
National	  Defence	  Expenditures,	  Fiscal	  Years	  1990-­‐
1996316	  
Year	   Total	  Dollars	  (in	  millions)	   %	  of	  GDP	  
1990	   $11,323	  	   1.70%	  
1991	   $10,759	  	   1.60%	  
1992	   $10,780	  	   1.50%	  
1993	   $11,087	  	   1.50%	  
1994	   $10,580	  	   1.40%	  
1995	   $9,817	  	   1.20%	  
1996	   $8,807	  	   1.10%	  
 
While the CF worked to continue their military relationship with the US, it was 
becoming more difficult as politicians and diplomats in Ottawa no longer viewed the CF 
as an important element of Canada’s foreign policy, due to a lack of perceived threats to 
Canada across the globe. NATO, NORAD and the common defence of the West against 
the Warsaw Pact had been the main reasons for Canadian governments to maintain a 
significant regular military and strive for defence cooperation with Washington. 
However, with the threat from the Soviet Union now gone and with Canada’s continued 
involvement in the NATO and NORAD alliances being questioned, the CF saw its main 
defence objectives being questioned. Instead of continuing to further the development of 
military relations between the two nations, Ottawa put them on hold in order to focus on 
internal political issues. 
The 1990s became some of the toughest years that the Canadian military had 
experienced since the end of the Second World War. Throughout the decade the CF were 
characterized by “personnel burn-out, equipment rust out and the myriad embarrassments 
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of the…disbanding of the Canadian Airborne Regiment.”317 Jean Chretien’s tenure as 
Prime Minister also brought about increasingly vocal calls by the American Department 
of Defense to increase Canadian defence spending, a situation eerily similar to that of 
Trudeau in the late 1970s.318 While Chretien did not pull back from the NATO or 
NORAD agreements, he also did not see the CF as playing an important role in either of 
these important alliances. Instead he chose to redirect funds towards paying off the 
expanding Canadian national debt and improving health and education across Canada. 
Despite Chretien’s success in trimming down the Canadian debt and vastly improving the 
health and education sectors, he used the new geo-strategic situation to reduce the 
military as well as reduce defence budgets and personnel strength of the CF.319 However, 
in a situation that mirrored that of Trudeau in the 1970s, Chretien continued to send the 
CF on worldwide UN and NATO missions that stretched the CF to the breaking point and 
once again brought calls from Washington to increase the budget, equipment and 
personnel available to the CF. 
 Throughout the Cold War, the Canadian and United States militaries worked 
closely together in both North American and European defence. While the US had been 
interested in a bilateral defence agreement with Canada since the Second World War, 
Ottawa had no interest in a bilateral alliance and instead strove to become a political 
equal with Washington in North American defence issues. In 1963, when Lester B. 
Pearson became the new Prime Minister of Canada, and with the subsequent appointment 
of Paul Hellyer as his Minister of National Defence, the Canadian military began to be 
turned towards the large American armed forces. Prior to 1963, the Canadian armed 
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forces had a historical defence relationship with the United Kingdom that had stretched 
back to the colonial militia era of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, with 
the end of the Second World War, the UK was no longer in an economic or military 
position to maintain a strong bilateral arrangement with Canada. Furthermore, with the 
many conflicts ongoing in the former colonies of the British Empire, the Canadian 
government felt that it needed to move itself away from the military shadow of the UK 
and towards a new distinctly Canadian model. However, in the process of moving the 
military away from the UK, Pearson and Hellyer instead began to move it towards greater 
cooperation with the US armed forces. 
 From 1963 to 1989, policy-makers in Ottawa often held a similar view in regards 
to North American defence relations. This view was that because of the high costs 
necessary to defend a country of Canada’s size, defence agreements with the US should 
be pursued, as they would help guarantee Canadian sovereignty and security at a low cost 
for Ottawa.320 Throughout this period Canada developed a ‘special relationship’ with the 
US in defence affairs, which was based on common international goals and economic 
practices.321 As a result of the powerful nuclear and conventional forces of the US, 
Ottawa did not consider the risk of an attack on North America very likely for much of 
the period. As a result, the federal governments often focused their military efforts on the 
protection of Canadian sovereign airspace and waterways. 
  Beginning in 1964 with the tabling of the Pearson government’s new White 
Paper on Defence, Ottawa embarked on a path that would bring the Canadian military 
ever closer to the US military. By 1989 the Canadian Forces and the Ministry of National 
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Defence had developed an intricate relationship with their American counterparts. As 
scholars Joel Sokolsky and D.W. Middlemiss argue, the US “always has a security 
interest in Canada, and Canada has an interest in not becoming a strategic liability for the 
United States.”322 It was this interest in not becoming a ‘strategic liability’ to the US that 
guided successive Canadian defence policies from 1963 to 1989. If Canada was to 
become a liability for the US in North American defence, then scholars, politicians and 
military officials firmly believed that the US would simply take over the responsibility 
for the defence of Canada, which would have had grave impacts on Canadian 
sovereignty. For the governments of Pearson, Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney, the 
only way to not become a liability to the American defence establishment was to have the 
CF work closely with the US military in order to show Washington that Ottawa took its 
defence seriously. 
 While the Canadian military had begun to work with the US military since the 
onset of the Second World War, it was not until the appointment of Paul Hellyer as the 
Minister of National Defence and the tabling of the White Paper on Defence in 1964 that 
the Canadian armed forces began to reorient towards the US. Hellyer was given free-
reign by Pearson in his attempt to eliminate many of the ties between the Canadian and 
British military forces. However, in his desire to eliminate these traditions as fast as 
possible, Hellyer failed to allow time for the introduction and creation of distinct 
Canadian military traditions. This void simply moved the Canadian military towards the 
traditions of the US armed forces. 
Fundamental to Hellyer’s White Paper was the plan to reorganize the Canadian 
armed forces into a unified force where all three branches would support and work 
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together in common goals. However, instead of creating a distinctly Canadian format for 
this new potential tri-service force, Hellyer originally looked towards the United States 
Marine Corps as the ideal organization and structure for Canada’s new military 
reorganization. This idea had been speculated by retired Canadian General Guy Simonds 
in 1964 and brought to the attention of Hellyer by former General Charles Foulkes. While 
Hellyer believed that the USMC structure was ideal for a military the size of Canada, it 
became the focal point for the fight against unification by members of the military and 
the public. While Hellyer had planned to create a tri-service force in order to reduce 
wasteful defence spending occurring because of the intense competitions between the 
military branches, it was clear by 1965 that a USMC structure would require an 
exorbitant amount of new funding for the military. To successfully transform the 
Canadian armed forces into a USMC-style organization would require a vast amount of 
money for new equipment. The staggering costs of new equipment as well as military and 
government pressure to ensure that the Canadian military did not become a wing of the 
US armed forces resulted in this potential USMC organizational scheme being scrapped 
by Hellyer by the end of 1965. Despite this, the personnel and officers of the Canadian 
military began to see the writing on the wall and soon found themselves working more 
closely with their American counterparts in exercises in North America as well as 
movement towards the US Army and US Air Force in Germany. 
The rise of Pierre Trudeau to the Prime Minister’s office in 1968 resulted in the 
CF’s roles and objectives being changed once again. In a situation vastly different from 
Pearson’s tenure as PM, the CF saw their military objectives being reoriented towards 
North America and away from the internationalism that had distinguished the Pearson 
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years. Trudeau and Donald Macdonald, his Minister of Defence from 1970 to 1972, 
firmly believed that as Western European countries had been rebuilt both economically 
and militarily, they did not need CF personnel permanently stationed on the continent to 
help them defend Europe. Instead, Trudeau originally wanted to withdraw these forces 
and have them focus on defending Canada and North America. As a result of these two 
goals, Trudeau and Macdonald switched the military’s main objective from the defence 
of Western Europe to the defence of Canadian sovereignty and North America. This new 
primary objective was designed by Trudeau to attempt to redress the rather lopsided 
American military dominance in North America. However, while Trudeau wished to 
address this imbalance, he also soon realized that the two countries had created an 
intertwined continental defence through the many treaties and agreements signed since 
the beginning of the Second World War.  
To ensure that the US never took over sole responsibility for the defence of North 
America, Trudeau wanted the Canadian Forces in Europe to be redirected back to 
Canada, which he believed would help protect Canada’s sovereignty from unwanted 
American military assistance. Furthermore, having these forces at home would enable 
Trudeau to indicate to Washington that Canada was making a large contribution to the 
defence of the US nuclear deterrent in North America. The defence of the US nuclear 
deterrent had been one of the cornerstones of Canadian defence policy since the creation 
of NORAD in 1957. Previous Canadian governments believed that the best way to defend 
this was the forward defence of North America in Western Europe. Trudeau, however, 
argued that as Western Europe now had the ability to defend itself, the CF in Europe 
needed to be brought back home to focus on the defence of Canada and the US nuclear 
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forces. Despites these goals, Trudeau did not withdraw Canadian military forces from 
Europe but simply reduced the air and land components stationed in Europe. 
Furthermore, in his attempt to redirect the military’s priorities back towards North 
America, he significantly reduced the defence share of Canada’s gross national product, 
which had fallen to one of the lowest in NATO by 1976. With the CF in dire need of new 
equipment and a movement towards conventional forces by the US and NATO, Trudeau 
was pressured to ‘rebuild’ the CF by Canada’s Alliance partners by the end of the decade. 
By 1978 the NATO and the US began to severely pressure the Trudeau 
Government to re-equip the CF, which was using equipment that was rapidly being 
retired by other NATO allies and that was not suitable for modern combat operations in 
Europe or any high-intensity combat zone. In standing with one of Canada’s fundamental 
foreign policies, that of not becoming a strategic liability of the US, the Trudeau and 
Mulroney governments began to undertake a rapid modernization program of the CF. In 
addition to this modernization program, Ottawa began to work closely with Washington 
to help reshape NATO and North American defence strategies and policies. As Ronald 
Reagan began to build up the conventional forces of the US, he also demanded that the 
rest of NATO follow suit.  
Air Command worked directly with the USAF in order to create an integrated air 
defence strategy using the fighter and air defence forces available to both countries to 
defend North America in the event of a major conflict. The Canadian purchase of the CF-
18 Hornet fighter aircraft and the heavily-debated 1986 renewal of the NORAD 
Agreement allowed Ottawa to participate as a partner, and not a dependent, in the air 
defence of North America. In West Germany Mobile Command worked tirelessly to be 
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able to work seamlessly with I (US) Corps in the event of war. This was followed by a 
number of US Army doctrines and strategies being adopted by Mobile Command in both 
Canada and West Germany. While forces of Mobile Command retained their Canadian 
identity, they had to be prepared to operate within larger American divisions, corps and 
army groups throughout Europe in the event of war. 
Despite the work that Air and Mobile Commands were doing to assist the US in 
the defence of the West, Maritime Command found itself at the centre of a major re-
equipment controversy between Ottawa and Washington. While Canadian warships had 
developed a close working relationship with the USN since the end of the Second World 
War, the RCN found itself under fire when Prime Minister Mulroney announced his 
government’s intention to purchase a fleet of nuclear-attack submarines for ASW 
operations and surveillance of Canada’s Arctic region. The USN, however, viewed the 
Arctic as an essential area of operations for its own fleet of nuclear submarines and did 
not want to have to share this area with Canadian submarines. Furthermore, USN 
officials were concerned that they would have to provide Ottawa with the locations of 
their submarines in the Arctic, which could then find their way into the hands of Soviet 
officials. The Mulroney Government, because of financial limitations, canceled the 
project in 1988, but this episode did provide one of the biggest examples of direct 
American involvement in Canadian defence operations. 
Throughout the Cold War, the US and Canada developed a close working 
relationship in security and defence matters. In North America, Western Europe and 
across the globe, the militaries of both countries worked together and assisted each other 
when necessary. Both the Canadian and American militaries predominantly developed 
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their tactics and strategies based on the forward defence of North America in Europe, as 
there was a very low risk of a major assault on North America for much of the period.323 
While Canadian governments often trumpeted continental defence as their primary 
security objective, the reality was both the US and Canada oriented their forces towards 
Europe and did not pay considerable attention to defensive preparations in North 
America.324 For much of the Cold War the majority of Canadian air, land and naval units 
were either working directly in the defence of Western Europe or were planned as 
reinforcements in the event of any conflict. Canadian land and air units in Europe worked 
directly with their American counterparts, as they were part of larger American units for 
much of the Cold War. Meanwhile, MARCOM participated in larger USN task forces in 
preparing for ASW and convoy escort operations in the North Atlantic and the Pacific 
Oceans. Despite some concerns from Canadian politicians throughout the period, Ottawa 
often felt comfortable working with Washington concerning defence preparations, as it 
was similar to the defence participation with London that had dominated Canadian 
security policy since the eighteenth century. 
Despite the importance that is placed upon Canadian-American defence relations 
by Canadian military scholars, few provide an in-depth analysis of the 1963 to 1989 
period. It was during this period of intense international tensions that the Canadian-
American defence relationship really developed into a well-honed military alliance. 
Throughout the three decades of leadership under Pearson, Trudeau and Mulroney the 
Canadian Forces developed an increasingly ‘special relationship’ with their counterparts 
                                                
323 David S. Sorenson, “The Future of the North American Air Defense System”, in Fifty Years of Canada-
United States Defence Cooperation: The Road from Ogdensburg, ed. Joel J. Sokolsky et al. (Lewiston, NY: 
The Edwin Mullen Press, 1992), 264. 
324 Ibid., 264. 
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in the US armed forces. This ‘special relationship’ was not brought about by American 
military and political leaders but was instead created by Canadian political leaders 
pushing the CF closer to the US. The numerous attempts by Canadian politicians to 
create and retain a distinctly Canadian military identity only resulted in Canadian defence 
institutions being pushed into closer cooperation with their American allies in military 
operations in North American and throughout the world.  
While North American military scholars often acknowledge that Canadian-
American defence participation really took off during the Cold War, few actually provide 
an in-depth analysis of this period, with most scholars only providing a brief overview of 
the Cold War. The works that do examine this period of North American defence 
relations predominantly examine either the government interactions between Ottawa and 
Washington or the military cooperation between the CF and US armed forces. However, 
both of these are instrumental elements in understanding the Canadian-American defence 
cooperation and need to be examined together and not separately. Another gap in the 
literature of this subject is that scholars tend to focus on the Second World War and the 
end of the Cold War, often marginalizing the 1963 to 1989 period. Three chronological 
periods have been examined in the course of this thesis in order to provide a concise 
overview of Canadian-American defence relations during the Cold War and to identify 
what group brought about this increased cooperation. 
From the beginning of 1963, when Canadian Prime Minister Pearson appointed 
Paul Hellyer as the new Minister of National Defence, through to the end of 1989, it was 
clear that it was the Canadian federal government that was pushing the Canadian military 
into increased cooperation with the United States. Despite the concerns of some Canadian 
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politicians about this increased cooperation, they inadvertently continued to push the 
Canadian Forces ever closer to the US. The end result was that by the end of the Cold 
War, the US had replaced the UK as Canada’s primary military partner and ally. While 
politicians in Ottawa continuously questioned this relationship, members of all Canadian 
political parties came to recognize the benefits that increased military cooperation 
between the two countries would have for Canada.  
Cooperation with the United States in military affairs enabled political and 
defence officials in Ottawa to accomplish a number of objectives throughout the period. 
First, this cooperation enabled Ottawa to keep defence budgets relatively stable 
throughout the Cold War. By keeping the defence budget stable, the governments of 
Pearson, Trudeau and Mulroney were able to redirect funds that would have been sent to 
national defence towards the creation of new social welfare programs throughout Canada. 
The presence of the large US armed forces enabled Ottawa to focus on internal issues 
instead of its international military objectives. The second benefit was that having the 
Canadian Forces work closely with the US military allowed Ottawa to show the US 
government that it was able to make a contribution to North American and NATO 
defence. This objective became very important to Canadian military and political leaders 
because if they did not prove to the US that they could make a meaningful contribution to 
Western defence than the US would simply take over for the defence of North America, 
which would have had grave consequences on Canadian sovereignty. By the end of the 
Cold War, Canadian defence cooperation with the US was as much about ensuring 
Canada’s sovereignty than anything else. 
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 While American political and defence officials came to welcome this increased 
cooperation throughout the period, they were always cautious in making any military 
demands of Canada because of the highly developed anti-American sentiment throughout 
Canada. Ottawa continuously wanted to focus its military capabilities on North American 
defence while Washington strove to have Canada take on a larger role in NATO and 
European defence. Despite the rapidly changing size and objectives of the CF during the 
Cold War, the one constant was the cooperation with the US that was being pushed on it 
by politicians in Ottawa. The only way for Canada to live under the large US defence 
umbrella was for Canadian politicians to prove that they were willing to participate with 
the US in Western defence. American military equipment, strategies, training methods 
and organizations were gradually adopted by the CF during the Cold War in an effort by 
Canadian politicians to ensure that Washington remained convinced in Canada’s ability 
to protect the northern portions of North America and, as a result, the US nuclear and 
conventional military deterrent.  
As Canada is the only ally directly involved in the defence of the United States, 
the defence relations between the two countries have been extremely close. The formal 
agreements and interactions between the two allies during the 1964-1989 period created a 
framework for military relations that was to extend past the end of the Cold War. North 
American defence analyst Joel Sokolsky states that these relationships go well beyond 
formal institutions and “involve a whole network of formal contacts between the services, 
notably in the air forces, navies and defence bureaucracies.”325 Even though the US 
military dwarfed the CF and was capable of defending the entire continent, both 
                                                
325 Sokolsky, Defending Canada, 9. 
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Washington and Ottawa recognized that it was important that both countries participated 
in the defence of North America and that of Western Europe. 
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